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Abstract 
We study the effects of a policy aimed at attracting more experienced and better qualified 
teachers in primary schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods in Uruguay. Teachers in these 
schools could earn higher salaries. Estimates from regression discontinuity models show that the 
policy increased experience by two to three years. The policy was especially successful in ‘hiring 
experience from other schools’, but also increased tenure. However, the effect on student 
outcomes appears to be small. The distinction between ‘hiring or keeping’ teachers seems 
important for explaining this result. Keeping teachers appears to be more beneficial for students 
than hiring experienced teachers. We also find that the effect of the policy is better for schools 
that replaced teachers with less than five years of experience. 
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1. Introduction 
In most countries teachers are not randomly allocated across schools but they are free to decide 
on the schools they would like to work at. In general, more experienced and better qualified 
teachers are less likely to teach in schools that serve children from relatively poor families (e.g. 
Hanushek et al. 2004; Clotfelter et al. 2007, 2008). This allocation of teachers across schools 
might have important short term and long term consequences as there are large differences 
between teachers in their impact on student outcomes (Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et al., 2005; 
Aaronson et al., 2007; Kane & Staiger, 2008; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2010; Chetty et al., 2014; 
Hanushek, 2011). In particular, differences in experience among teachers, especially in the initial 
years of the teaching career, are related to differences in student outcomes (Rivkin et al. 2005; 
Rockoff 2004; Harris & Sass 2011; Papay & Kraft 2015; Wiswall 2013). This implies that a non-
random allocation of teachers can create differences in learning outcomes across schools and 
students, which will enhance the learning problems of students in disadvantaged areas. To 
address these issues one might consider offering higher salaries to more experienced and better 
qualified teachers for working in schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Such a policy could 
mitigate the non-random allocation of teachers and improve the outcomes of students in the 
targeted schools.  
 This study investigates the impact of a policy program, the so-called CSCC-program, 
which explicitly aimed to reallocate more experienced and better qualified teachers to schools in 
poor neighborhoods. Teachers in primary education in Uruguay could obtain increases in their 
base salaries up to 26 % by working in schools in poor neighborhoods1. This policy was 
expected to have an impact especially on the decisions of experienced teachers due to specific 
characteristics of the teacher labor market. Teachers in primary education in Uruguay have to 
apply for a job each year. The application process is administered by a central authority which 
sets the criteria for the assignment of teachers to jobs in schools. The key feature of the system is 
that experienced teachers may choose first from the available teaching slots among schools. This 
implies that more experienced teachers are given priority in the decision at which school to work 
and in the decision about obtaining a higher salary through working in the poor neighborhoods. 
                                                          
1 The program also includes several non-salary components, like equipment and learning materials, but these 
components appear to be less important, see Section 2. 
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In this study we investigate two potential impacts of this funding policy. First, we investigate the 
impact of the policy on the experience and tenure of the teaching staff in schools in the targeted 
neighborhoods. Second, we study the impact of the policy on test scores and non-test-score 
outcomes of students in poor neighborhoods.  
 For identifying the impact of the policy we exploit variation between schools induced by 
the eligibility rule for participation of schools in the program. Since 2005 eligibility for the 
program is determined by a poverty index that aims to capture the living conditions in 
neighborhoods. Schools with a score on the poverty index above a certain threshold are eligible 
for the program. This assignment scheme allows the use of regression discontinuity models for 
estimating intention to treat and treatment on the treated effects of the program. For the 
estimation we use administrative panel data of all public primary schools in Uruguay since 1992. 
This database contains information about the experience and tenure of teachers at the grade level 
of all public schools2. Moreover, we use data about test scores and non-test score outcomes 
(grade retention, dropout and insufficient attendance). In general, test scores have been the focus 
of economic research about educational outcomes but they might miss changes in ‘non-cognitive 
skills’ that have been shown to be important for adult outcomes3. A recent literature relates non-
test-score outcomes to character skills, and shows that teachers can have meaningful effects on 
non-test-score outcomes (Jackson, forthcoming; Gershenson, 2016; Ladd & Sorenson, 2017). 
Our data allow us to study the effects of the program on these ‘cognitive and non-cognitive’ 
outcomes up to eight years after 2005. This implies that we can yield estimates that are robust to 
implementation issues from the initial years of the redesigning of the program. 
This paper investigates the effects of an unconditional pay increase within a teacher labor 
market setting that favors more experienced teachers. In general, it is not clear whether an 
unconditional pay increase may have an impact on student performance, as is illustrated by a 
large literature that finds mixed effects of additional school resources (Benabou et al. 2009; Card 
                                                          
2 On average schools have two teachers per grade. The results are very similar when we use data of individual 
teachers from our database. 
3 See e.g. Borghans, Weel and Weinberg (2008), Heckman & Rubinstein (2001), Heckman et al. (2006, 2013) and 
Lindqvist and Vestman (2011). Several studies also find that long term outcomes of educational interventions cannot 
be fully explained by changes in test scores (Chetty et al. 2011; Fredriksson et al. 2013; Heckman et al. 2013). 
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& Payne 2002; Chay et al. 2005; Leuven et al. 2007; Van der Klaauw 2008). However, the 
recent literature suggests that the impact of additional resources depends on whether the 
resources are targeted at productive characteristics of schools and teachers (e.g. Jackson, Johnson 
and Persico, 2016). This insight provides a framework for the expected impact of the policy that 
we study in this paper. If schools in targeted neighborhoods will be able to obtain a more 
experienced teaching staff, then the impact of the policy on student outcomes will depend on 
whether these teachers are more productive. The empirical literature points to two aspects of 
experience that might be important for teacher productivity. First, experience can be obtained 
within the current school but also within other schools, and hence will contain general and 
specific components of human capital. The effects of these components on student outcomes 
might differ (Ost 2014). As such, the impact of the policy might depend on whether it especially 
affects ‘hiring of new teachers’ or ‘keeping of current teachers’. Second, it is well known that the 
quality of teachers improves especially in the first years of teaching (e.g. Hendricks 2014). This 
non-linearity in the relationship between teacher experience and student outcomes implies that 
the impact depends on whether the policy induces replacement of unexperienced teachers (less 
than five years of experience) or replacement of experienced teachers (at least five years of 
experience. Furthermore, the literature suggests that experience is especially important in early 
grades (Krueger (1999), Chetty et al. (2011) and Gerritsen et al. (2017)). This implies that the 
impact of the policy may also depend on the allocation of additional experience across grades. 
 We find that the program is successful in increasing experience, especially by 
reallocating experienced teachers to schools in the targeted neighborhoods. Estimates from 
regression discontinuity models show large effects on the teaching staff in the targeted schools. 
For the most relevant years the policy on average increased the experience of the teaching staff 
by two to three years. This means that in each class within each grade the experience of the 
teacher increased on average with two to three years. Estimates of the treatment on the treated 
effect indicate effects of three to seven years of experience. Moreover, we also find that tenure 
(years of experience at the current school) increased by approximately one year in the targeted 
schools, and by one to two years in the schools that actually participated in the program. This 
difference in the experience of the teaching staff between schools across the cut-off for program 
eligibility stayed on for several years.  
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Despite these large changes in the composition of the teaching staff the impact on student 
performance appears to be small. Across a range of non-test-score measures and test-score 
outcomes we fail to detect a consistent positive impact of the CSCC-program. We find some 
evidence that the program increases school attendance of students, especially the attendance of 
students in grades 1 and 2. However, these results are not robust to the specification of the 
forcing variable or to the discontinuity sample that is used for the estimation. We don’t find an 
effect of the program on grade retention or drop out, nor on test scores in math and language. 
Student mobility is unlikely to affect the estimated effects due to the application of fixed 
catchment areas in primary education in Uruguay. Moreover, we don’t find an increase of the 
proportion of disadvantaged students in the targeted schools. This leads us to conclude that the 
effects of the CSCC-program on student outcomes are likely to be quite small.  
The distinction between ‘hiring’ and ‘keeping’ teachers seems to be important for 
explaining the modest results of the program. We find that the program especially affects ‘hired 
experience’. Moreover, ‘hired experience’ is not associated with student outcomes, whereas 
tenure (years of experience in the current school) is found to be important for student outcomes. 
This implies that the CSCC-program especially affects the component of experience that is less 
relevant for student performance. We also find that the non-linearity of the teacher productivity-
experience profiles (Hendricks, 2014; Papay & Kraft, 2015) might be important for explaining 
the modest results. The program induces replacement of teachers who are on the steepest part of 
the productivity-experience profile, but also replaces teachers who are on parts of the 
productivity-profile that are less steep. The latter replacements are less efficient, and thereby 
might reduce the impact of the program. We find that the effects of the program are better for 
schools that had more replacements of teachers with less than five years of experience. 
 Our study contributes to several branches of the literature that studies the relationship 
between the teacher labor market and school performance4. The first part of our paper is related 
to the literature that investigates the effect of teacher pay on turnover rates (see for instance 
Dolton and Van der Klaauw 1995, 1999; Murnane et al. 1989; Hanushek et al. 2004; Imazeki 
2005; Clotfelter et al. 2011; Gilpin 2011). These studies typically find that increases in teacher 
pay reduce turnover of teachers. However, these findings might be biased as changes in teacher 
                                                          
4 This paper focuses on the teacher labor market. For a comprehensive review of the literature on selection and 
incentive structures of public sector workers, see Finan et al. (2015).  
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pay might be correlated with unobserved time-varying characteristics. The estimated effects tend 
to be smaller in studies that use arguably exogenous variation (Clotfelter et al. 2008; Hendricks 
2014). Our study contributes to this literature by using exogenous variation in teacher pay and 
focusing on the changes in the teaching staff that result from changes in tenure and from the 
entry of teachers that obtained experience at other schools. 
The second part of our paper is related to the literature that studies the relationship 
between teacher pay and student outcomes. Numerous studies have investigated this relationship 
but the evidence appears to be mixed. For instance, a review study about the effects of school 
inputs on student performance based on 90 studies (Hanushek, 1997, 2003) reports that only 
20 % of 119 estimates finds a positive effect of teacher pay on school performance. Several 
recent studies suggest that teacher pay has a positive effect on student performance (Loeb & 
Page 2000; Britton & Propper 2016; Dolton & Marcenaro-Gutierrez 2011). However, a recent 
study based on a randomized experiment finds no effect of the unconditional doubling of teacher 
pay on student performance after two and three years (De Ree et al. 2018). Our study contributes 
to this literature by looking at effects of higher teacher pay over a period of six years and using a 
transparent identification approach. A longer period for investigating the program effects is 
important as it is not clear how and when teacher pay will affect student performance 
(Hendricks, 2014). 
This study also contributes to the branch of the literature that looks at the importance of 
teacher characteristics, in particular teacher experience, for student performance (e.g. Rivkin et 
al. 2005; Rockoff 2004; Harris & Sass 2011; Papay & Kraft 2015; Wiswall 2013; Gerritsen et al. 
2017). These studies show that teacher experience matters, especially in the first four or five 
years of the teaching career. Hendricks (2014) exploits these typical productivity-experience 
profiles for linking retention rates of teachers induced by changes in teacher pay to school 
performance. He finds that teacher pay reduces turnover rates but the effects on school 
performance are small. Our study contributes to this literature by investigating the impact of 
higher teacher salaries on changes in the teaching staff and on student outcomes for the same 
schools. Moreover, in our study we can distinguish between changes in the teaching staff due to 
changes in tenure and due to newly hired teachers. 
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Finally, our paper contributes to the literature that studies the impact of extra school 
resources for disadvantaged students or schools in disadvantaged areas (Benabou et al. 2009; 
Card & Payne 2002; Chay et al. 2005; Leuven et al. 2007; Van der Klaauw 2008). The evidence 
from these studies is mixed and ranges from negative to positive effects of additional funding. 
However, recent studies show that additional resources can make a difference if they are targeted 
at productive characteristics of schools or teachers (e.g. Jackson, Johnson and Persico, 2016). 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background and the specific program that we study in this paper. Section 3 discusses the data 
used in the estimation. In Section 4 we explain the empirical strategy. Sections 5 and 6 show the 
main estimation results about the impact of the program on teachers and on students. In Section 7 
we focus on the mechanisms that might explain our main finding; the modest effects on student 
outcomes despite the large increases in teacher experience. Finally, Section 8 concludes.  
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2. Institutional Background and the CSCC-Program 
Uruguay is a country of 3.4 million inhabitants located in the south-eastern region of South 
America, sharing borders with Argentina and Brazil. It has a per capita income of USD 21,944 
which places Uruguay in the World Bank list of high-income economies. In the PISA 2012 test 
Uruguayan students scored 409 points, which places them high at the regional level but low 
compared to the OECD average (494 points). The educational system delivers quite unequal 
results. For instance, it has one of the largest standard deviations in the performance of schools 
and between 2003 and 2012 inequality has further increased.  
Primary education in Uruguay has universal coverage and the majority of children attend 
schools from the public system (85% in 2010). Students attend two years of preschool education 
(Educación Inicial) and six years of primary school (Escuela Primaria). Most students enrol in 
so-called Standard Urban schools. These schools have approximately 350 students (50 in 
preschool and 300 in primary school), 11 teachers and a class size of 25 students. The program 
that we will study in this paper provides extra resources to Standard Urban schools in poor 
neighbourhoods. The central administration of the education system (central authority) plays a 
key role in the system. This agency is responsible for the hiring of teachers and the payment of 
their salaries. Schools don’t hire teachers themselves but this is done by the central authority. 
Only certified teachers are allowed to work in primary education. 
 
The CSCC- program 
The CSCC- program (Contexto Socio Cultural Crítico) provides extra resources to schools that 
are located in disadvantaged areas of the country. The aim of the program is to improve school 
performance of children from families living in poor neighbourhoods. In Uruguay students are 
obliged to attend the school in their neighbourhood. The program has been implemented since 
1995 at the national level, and there are CSCC schools in every state of the country. In 1995 the 
first 155 schools were assigned to the program based on indicators of school performance and 
characteristics of the neighbourhood. Since 1995 the number of participating schools and the 
eligibility rules of the program have changed several times mostly due to changes in the 
available governmental resources.  
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 The CSCC program consists of several components. The main, and the only component 
of the program that is strictly enforced, is an increase in the salary of teachers. The higher 
salaries for teachers that decide to work in the CSCC schools have the explicit aim of getting a 
more experienced and better qualified teaching staff in the poor schools. The following quote 
taken from the Parliamentary Budget Law (2005) illustrates this: “The higher salary will be 
offered to teachers working at CSCC schools, with the aim of encouraging to attract the most 
experienced and best qualified ones”.5 The extra salary consists of a fixed amount for all teachers 
working in CSCC schools, and is not tied to performance or to a teacher’s position in the 
payment scale. The extra payment is determined as a 26% increase over the base salary in the 
first category of the payment scale. A teacher´s full salary consists of the base salary plus 
additional payments, which increase the base salary by approximately 70%.6 The extra salary 
from the CSCC-program increases the full salary for a teacher in the first level of the payment 
scale by approximately 15%. Table A.1 in the appendix shows teachers’ salaries from 1997 to 
2010 by payment scale. The payment scale includes seven categories. A new teacher starts in 
category #1 and moves to category #2 after four years. Hence, after 12 years of work, she can 
reach the 4th category: this is equal to an increase of 15% in her base salary. This implies that the 
extra salary from the CSCC-program represents a substantial increase compared to the regular 
teacher salary scales.  
The CSCC-program also provides schools with equipment, learning materials and 
improved lunchrooms. Moreover, the program includes components like ‘additional time for 
coordination between teachers’ (aimed at institutional development activities, curriculum 
planning, coordination on program content and evaluation criteria, etc.) and (voluntary) ‘training 
sessions for teachers’. These components of the program are similar to the ones implemented in 
other countries, for instance in Chile (Chay, McEwan and Urquiola, 2005). The importance of 
these non-salary components is not clear as they are not strictly enforced, and there are no 
                                                          
5The original text in Spanish: “El mayor salario también atenderá a los docentes que cumplan sus funciones en los 
centros educativos de contexto socio cultural crítico, con el objetivo de propiciar la radicación de los más 
experimentados y mejor calificados.” 
6 The calculation of teacher salaries is quite complicated. For instance, the additional payments for teachers consist 
of 20 items.  
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statistics available about the allocation of the budget of the CSCC program.7 Statistics are only 
available about the total budget of primary education; they show that more than 80 % is spent on 
teacher salaries.8 Nevertheless, our database might shed some light on the importance of the non-
salary components as it contains information about several school resources that are quite similar 
to the non-salary components of the CSCC program (% children having lunch at school, school 
has library room, computers for educational use, number of computers, number of study books 
per pupil in 1st grade, school has community teacher). We have investigated whether the schools 
that we are comparing in our evaluation of the effects of the CSCC-program differ with respect 
to the use of these resources. For this analysis we have used the main regression discontinuity 
models that will be explained in Section 4. The estimates from these models, which are shown in 
Table A.2 in the appendix, reveal no difference in the use of these resources. It should also be 
noted that the information on these resources is available for the years in which there was a high 
compliance with the eligibility rules of the program (see below). This implies that the treatment 
effects of the program that we are estimating in the next sections are mainly driven by the salary 
component.  
 Eligibility for the program is completely determined by the central administration of the 
education system. Schools don’t apply for the program, nor can they opt in or out of the program. 
This bureaucratic feature of the program reduces concerns about non-random selection of 
schools into the program. The program is targeted at schools in disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
and schools are selected using eligibility rules. These rules have changed several times since 
1995 (see Appendix ‘The primary education system in Uruguay and the history of the program’). 
Key to our analysis is the redesigning of the program in 2005. Since 2005 eligibility for the 
program is determined by a poverty index. This index is based on a set of indicators about 
parental education, poverty and social integration and created by using factor analysis9. Schools 
                                                          
7 From the accountants of the central administration we learned that CSCC schools were given priority with respect 
to the allocation of the other components. In case that there were not enough resources for all schools then the 
resources were first delivered at the CSCC schools.  
8 See: http://www.anep.edu.uy/anep/phocadownload/Publicaciones_DSPP/gastos%20y%20salarios%201985-
2011.pdf 
9 Poverty was measured with an unmet basic needs index based on information about overcrowded homes, the 
materials used to construct the house, where families obtain water to drink, and the sanitary services of the house. 
The social integration index was constructed from information on integration in the territory (percentage of students 
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were ranked according to their score on the index, and eligibility for the program was determined 
by a threshold value. The redesigning of the program in 2005 provides a transparent rule for the 
assignment of schools to the program which is important for the identification of the effects. The 
poverty score of 2005 also determined eligibility for the program for the following years until 
2010. Hence, the poverty score doesn’t change between years. In our empirical approach we 
exploit the poverty index and the threshold value within a regression discontinuity framework 
(see Section 4). The CSCC-program already exists since 1995 but the eligibility rules for the 
period before 2005 are not clear. We, therefore, focus the analysis on the period since 2005. The 
eligibility rules changed again in 2011 and induced non-compliance with the eligibility rules of 
2005. 
Figure 1 provides information about the implementation of the redesigning of the 
program for the period 2005-2010. The figure shows participation in the program (Y-axis) by 
score on the poverty index. Schools with poverty scores above zero are eligible for the program. 
Each dot in the figure represents the mean of the dependent variable (program participation) for 
schools located within a bin of width 0.1 of the poverty score. In 2009 and 2010 all schools that 
were eligible for the program actually participated in the program. Moreover, there were no 
schools participating that were not eligible. This means that there is full-compliance with the 
assignment rules in 2009 and 2010. In the years before we observe a transition towards full 
compliance. Figure 1 also shows that this transition started with the inclusion of schools in the 
poorest areas into the program, hence, schools further away from the cut-off were the first to be 
included in the program. 
 
The CSCC-program and teacher experience 
A special feature of the education system in Uruguay is that teachers have to apply each year for 
a school. The application process is run by the central administration of the education system. 
They provide a list of available teaching jobs for which teachers can apply. Teachers can choose 
from this list the school at which they would like to work. Hence, schools don’t hire their 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
living in illegal land), integration in the education system of brothers and sisters of the students, and integration of 
the household head into the labor market. 
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teachers themselves, but teachers make the decision about the school. A key element in the 
application procedure is that teachers are ranked based on specific criteria set by the central 
administration. The experience of teachers is an important criterion for this ranking next to, for 
instance, pedagogical criteria10. The rank of the teacher determines the allocation of teachers to 
jobs. The teacher with the first rank is also the first who can choose from the available teaching 
slots11. Through this system more experienced teachers may choose first from the available 
teaching slots at schools. They will consider various factors such as commuting distance, school 
amenities, student population and school performance. This application procedure results in a 
negative correlation between the experience of the teaching staff and the poverty index of the 
school. For instance, in the year of the redesign of the policy (2005) this correlation is -0.25, 
which is statistically significant at the 1 %-level. This implies that students in poor 
neighbourhoods are taught by less experienced teachers. The CSCC Program tries to mitigate 
this by providing higher salaries to teachers that start working in the target schools.  
 
3. Data 
The main data we use in this study come from an administrative registry the so-called Monitor 
Educativo de Enseñanza  Primaria produced by the Department of Research and Statistics of the 
National Administration of Public Education (ANEP). This is the official source of information 
on the public education system of the country. The database has been compiled since 1992 and 
has been produced in a standardized way over the years. It is based on regular administrative 
registries, annual questionnaires among school principals (since 2002), and surveys among 
parents. It includes information on the education process (enrolment, average group size, 
students per teacher), educational outcomes (insufficient attendance, repetition and dropouts), 
human resources at each school (number of teachers and other staff, teacher experience and 
tenure), material resources (library, lunchroom, other infrastructure, school equipment), and the 
social context of each school. This information is available for all the public schools in the 
                                                          
10 For more details see Article 13 of the following policy document: 
http://www.anep.edu.uy/anep/phocadownload/normativa/estatuto%20del%20funcionario%20docente_151130.pdf 
11 In cases of ties there are rules about other factors that should be taken into consideration such as seniority in a 
teaching category, time of entering the public system first or year of graduation. 
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country. The database contains information at the school-level, at the grade-level and also 
information about individual teachers. The grade-level data are used in the main analysis. We use 
the individual teacher data in the analysis that looks at differences in the distribution of teachers 
within schools in Section 7.12  
 This study focuses on two types of outcomes. First, we look at the effect of the CSCC-
program on the teaching staff of schools. For this analysis we use teacher experience (working 
years in education) and tenure (years of experience at the same school) as outcome variables. 
These measures are typically used in studies that investigate the importance of teachers for 
student performance (see Section 1). Both variables are measured in years and are available at 
the grade level. Hence, for each school we know the average experience and tenure at the grade 
level in each year. Information about experience and tenure is available since 2002.  
The second type of outcomes is about student performance. The main database contains 
information about three non-test-score outcomes: insufficient attendance, grade retention and 
dropout. These non-test-score outcomes are very similar to the measures used in recent studies 
about the impact of teachers on ‘noncognitive skills’ and their longer-run outcomes (Jackson, 
forthcoming; Gershenson, 2016; Ladd & Sorenson, 2017). These recent studies also focus on 
measures of student attendance and grade progression. In our data insufficient attendance is 
defined as the percentage of students who attended school more than 70 days but less than 140 
days in the academic year. Grade retention is the percentage of students that were retained in a 
specific grade13. Decisions on grade retention are based on nationwide rules which, for instance, 
require a specific final score (‘bueno’) and 80 percent attendance during the school year 
(Circular 200/2008). These rules explicitly aim to standardize decisions regarding student 
progress in public primary education in the whole country14. Dropout is defined as the 
percentage of students that attended less than 70 days in the academic year. Information about 
these outcomes is available for each grade within each school since 1992. We have also 
constructed a fourth outcome variable ‘attendance’ based on more specific information about the 
                                                          
12 Unfortunately, the data don’t contain teacher identifiers which could enable investigating individual movements 
of teachers caused by the program. 
13 Manacorda (2012) uses the same variable in his analysis of the effect of grade retention in grades 7 to 9. 
14 http://www.ceip.edu.uy/documentos/carpetaarchivos/normativa/circulares/Circular200_08.pdf 
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number of days that students attended school. For each grade we have additional information 
about the number of students that attended school measured with the following categories: 1-70 
days, 71-130 days, 131-140 days, 141-150 days, 151-160 days, 161-170 days, 171 days or more. 
This information allows us to construct a more detailed variable on school ‘attendance’. 
The main database doesn’t contain test scores as there is no uniform test that is taken by 
all students in the country. However, for a sample of schools we were able to obtain achievement 
scores from standardized tests. The data come from the National Evaluation of Learning 
(Evaluación Nacional de Aprendizajes), which is the national assessment of learning, carried out 
by the central authority of the educational system. Math and language tests were taken by 
students in grade 6 in a representative sample of schools. We have data for the years 1999, 2002 
and 2009, respectively from 190, 272 and 251 schools with approximately 7,500 students in each 
year. 
The main database also contains a broad set of school and family characteristics. We use 
these variables for balancing tests around the cut-off. Table 1 shows summary statistics of the 
main variables in 2005 by eligibility for the program for all schools in the sample. In 2005 the 
database contains 374 schools at the left side of the cut-off and 284 schools at the right side of 
the cut-off. From these schools we have data about respectively 2,295 and 1,752 grades in 2005. 
We observe clear differences between eligible and non-eligible schools. Schools that are eligible 
for the program have a higher score on the poverty index and do worse on the family measures 
‘mother’s education’ and ‘children with unmet basic needs’. Moreover, teachers working in 
eligible schools on average have 12.2 years of experience, which is two years less than teachers 
at non-eligible schools. Teachers at eligible schools also have less tenure (the difference is more 
than one year). For the student outcomes we also observe clear differences. Eligible schools do 
worse on the three school performance outcomes and also experience more verbal and physical 
violence. Hence, schools that are eligible for the program are not a random draw from the 
population but score worse on teacher outcomes and student outcomes, and have less family 
resources. Changes in the outcome variables between 2005 and 2010 are shown in Table A.3 in 
the appendix. 
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4. Empirical strategy 
In this paper we are interested in the effect of the CSCC-program on the school choice of 
teachers and on the performance of students. For identifying the effect of the program we exploit 
the redesigning of the program that was introduced in 2005. Since 2005 eligibility for the 
program is based on a poverty index with a clear cutoff rule. Schools with a poverty score above 
a certain threshold are eligible for treatment. Schools with poverty scores below this threshold 
are not eligible. This assignment scheme allows the use of a standard regression discontinuity 
model for estimating the causal effect of the program. In this approach we can use the poverty 
index as the forcing variable and estimate the following equation: 
gitgitiigit XsfEY   210 )(     (1) 
where gitY  is the outcome for grade g of school i  at time t  (e.g. experience of teaching staff at 
time t or student performance at time t), iE is a dummy variable for eligibility for the CSCC 
program, is is the poverty score, gitX is a vector of control variables which also includes year and 
grade dummies,  and git are unobserved factors. In this specification (.)f is a smooth function of 
the forcing variable which is allowed to be different at either side of the cutoff. Schools are 
eligible for treatment ( 1iE ) if their poverty score is equal to or above the threshold oi ss  . 
Estimation of the parameter 1 will yield the causal effect of eligibility for the CSCC program 
since 2005 if there are no other discontinuities around the cutoff. This issue will be investigated 
below.  
 It is important to note that in our application program eligibility might affects schools on 
both sides of the cut-off. For instance, experienced teachers might move from non-eligible 
schools to schools that are eligible for the CSCC-program. Hence, due to the program some 
schools might gain experience and some schools might lose experience. The estimates of the 
parameter 1  will therefore reflect these two potential effects of eligibility for the program.  
In the first years after the redesigning of the program in 2005 there was non-compliance 
with the eligibility rule based on the poverty score. This non-compliance originates from two 
facts. First, the program already existed since 1995. Second, it took a few years to implement the 
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new assignment rules of the program (see also Figure 1 in Section 2). This explains that in the 
first years since 2005 some school that were not eligible still participated in the program and 
some school that were eligible didn’t participate in the program. This non-compliance gradually 
reduced, and in 2009 and 2010 full compliance was achieved. In the years after 2010 the 
eligibility rules of the program changed again, which also induced non-compliance with the 
2005-eligibility rules in 2011, 2012 and 2013. We estimate the treatment on the treated effect by 
using a standard IV-approach in which actual program participation ( itP ) is instrumented with 
program eligibility ( iE ): 
gitgitiiit XsfEP   210 )(     (2) 
   (3) 
 
The estimate of the parameter 1 can be interpreted as the causal effect of actual participation in 
the CSCC program on the outcomes in a specific year if the IV-assumptions with regard to the 
first stage, the independence assumption and the exclusion restriction hold. The instrument 
should be independent of the potential outcomes and the potential treatment statuses, and the 
instrument should only have an effect on the outcome through the endogenous variable (CSCC-
program participation). 
 
Identification issues 
A first issue for the application of our research design is that the program already exists since 
1995. Differences in program participation in the years before the redesigning of the program 
might confound the estimates. If schools on either side of the cutoff received more resources 
from earlier program participation this might bias the results. To investigate this issue we have 
estimated Equation (1) for each year since 1995 using as dependent variable ‘participation in the 
CSCC-program’. For the whole period since 1995 we find that there were no differences in 
program participation at the cutoff that might confound our estimates. These results are shown in 
the next sections (Figure 4 and Figure 6). 
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Next, we proceed with the main assumption in the regression discontinuity model that all 
observed and unobserved factors should behave smoothly around the cutoff. To test this 
assumption we first look at the density of the forcing variable at the cutoff to investigate whether 
schools might have manipulated their assignment to the program. It should be noted that this type 
of manipulation is not very likely as the assignment to the program is completely determined by 
the central authority (see Section 2).  Figure A.1 shows the density of the forcing variable across 
the cutoff based on the methods by Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2017). If schools would have 
manipulated their eligibility for treatment we would expect a larger density at the right side of 
the cutoff. However, we don’t observe this in the data. If anything, the density appears to be 
slightly, but statistically insignificant, higher at the left side of the cutoff. Both the conventional 
test as the robust bias-corrected test yield statistically insignificant results. Hence, these tests 
don’t indicate that the assignment to the program has been manipulated. 
As a second test we perform balancing tests of covariates and outcomes in the baseline 
year (2005). Figure 2 shows the results of these tests for the outcomes in 2005 and several 
covariates. Table A.4 in the appendix shows the balancing test using three discontinuity samples 
around the cutoff. These tests suggest that schools on both sides of the cut-off were very similar 
on teacher and student outcomes in 2005; we only observe a difference in school size.  
 
Robustness analysis 
For our main analyses we estimate models that include linear and quadratic specifications of the 
forcing variable. We investigate the robustness of the estimates to different specifications of the 
forcing variable. In particular, we use a cubic specification of the forcing variable and also use 
local polynomial Regression Discontinuity (RD) point estimators (first order and second order 
polynomials) with robust bias−corrected confidence intervals as developed in Calonico et al. 
(2014). In our main models we control for grade fixed effects, year fixed effects and, due to the 
balancing test, for school size (using a quadratic specification15). We also test the robustness of 
the results to including pre-treatment outcomes from the period before the redesigning of the 
program in 2005 and to including additional indicators of family background (‘mothers with 
                                                          
15 A linear specification yields similar results. 
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primary education or less’, ‘students with unmet basic needs’). As RD empirical results are often 
sensitive to the choice of the bandwidth, we show the results for different bandwidths. For our 
main estimates we use three discontinuity samples around the cut-off value of the forcing 
variable; schools within the ranges of 1.5, 1.0 and 0.5 standard deviations of the poverty score 
across the cut-off. Data-driven bandwidth selectors, as proposed in Calonico et al (2014) and 
Cattaneo et al. (2018), yield optimal bandwidths that correspond with the range of our 
discontinuity samples. The optimal bandwidth varies and depends on the bandwidth selector, the 
type of model (sharp or fuzzy regression discontinuity model), the model specification and the 
sample size.  
As we have data for multiple years since 2005 we pool the data for the relevant years 
(and include year dummies) to improve the precision of our estimates. An advantage of having 
multiple years of data is that our estimates will be less sensitive to confounding factors related 
with implementation issues in the initial years. Schools and teachers might need some time to 
adjust their decision to the new rules of the program. Hendricks (2014) notes that teacher pay 
may have a direct effect on the quality of the school but it is not clear when there will be an 
effect on student outcomes. With our data we can investigate the effect of the program up till 
201316. 
Systematic differences in missing values between schools might bias the results. Our data 
are obtained from administrative registries and collected for administrative reasons which 
mitigates this concern. To probe the randomness of the missing values we have estimated our 
main regression models using a dummy for missing outcome variable as dependent variable. 
These analyses don’t yield concerns about systematic differences in missing outcomes which 
might bias our results.  
                                                          
16 It should be noted that we are not estimating ‘long term effects’ of the program in models in which year t 
outcomes are regressed on program participation in year t-1 or year t-2. 
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5. The effect of the CSCC-program on the school choice of teachers 
The CSCC-program explicitly aimed at getting a more experienced and better qualified teaching 
staff in the targeted schools in the poor areas. As a first step in the analysis we investigate 
whether the school choice of teachers is affected by the difference in teacher pay induced by the 
program. Did the program succeed in getting more experienced teachers in the targeted schools 
in the poor areas?  
 A first impression of the effect of the program can be obtained from Figures 3 and 4. The 
top panel of Figure 3 shows the relationship between the average years of experience of the 
teaching staff in schools and the poverty score that was used for the eligibility for the CSCC-
program. This relationship is shown for 2005, the start of the program, for 2010, the last year 
when there was full-compliance with the program, and for 2013, the last year for which we have 
data. The bottom panel shows the relationships with the tenure of the teaching staff measured in 
years. Schools with scores above zero were eligible for the program. Each dot in the figure 
represents the mean of the dependent variable (experience or tenure) for schools located within a 
bin of width 0.1 of the poverty score. The figures use a linear and cubic fit for the regression 
lines at both sides of the cut-off for eligibility for the program. 
In the left figure of the top panel we observe a downward sloping relationship between 
the experience of the teaching staff and the poverty score. Schools in areas with a lower poverty 
score have a more experienced teaching staff. This relationship directly reflects the preferences 
of more experienced teachers as these teachers may first select a school from the available 
teaching slots (see Section 2). In 2005, at the start of the program, there is no difference in the 
experience of the teaching staff of schools at both sides of the cut-off for eligibility for the 
program. In 2010, however, the levels of experience at the cut-off are very different. Schools at 
the right of the cut-off, those that were eligible for the program, have a more experienced 
teaching staff than schools at the left of the cut-off. In 2013 the difference in experience was 
reduced. This can be explained by a reduction of program eligibility since 2010. 
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Changes in the tenure of the teaching staff are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 3. In 
2005 we also observe a downward slope for tenure suggesting that teachers not only prefer to 
work in schools in richer areas but also prefer to work more years in these schools. At the cut-off 
tenure is slightly higher at the left side. In 2010 the slope has become flatter and at the cut-off 
tenure is now slightly higher on the right side. In 2013 this difference appears to be slightly 
larger than in 2010. 
 Figure 4 further illustrates what happened over time. As we have data about experience 
and tenure since 2002 we can include several additional pre-treatment years. The figure shows 
the differences in program participation, experience and tenure for schools at the cut-off for 
program eligibility (the Y-axis) for each year between 2002 and 2013. These differences are 
obtained as point estimates from regression discontinuity models based on Equation (1) (see 
Table A.6 in the appendix for all the estimation results). The top panel of Figure 4 shows that the 
differences in program participation were small between 2002 and 200717. Program participation 
increased strongly for the eligible schools in 2008, and full compliance was achieved in 2009 and 
2010. After 2010 the difference in program participation declined fast which can be explained by 
the change in the eligibility rules in 2011. The figure also shows that the steepest increases and 
decreases in program participation difference took place in the smallest discontinuity samples. 
Hence, for schools close to the cut-off the largest differences in program participation occurred 
between 2008 and 2011. The middle panel shows the differences in experience of the teaching 
staff at the cut-off. We observe that these differences were very small between 2002 and 2008; 
the first seven years for which we have data on experience of teachers in schools. In the next 
years we observe a sharp increase in the experience difference. Schools that were eligible for the 
program obtain a more experienced teaching staff than schools that were not eligible. The 
difference in experience increases to two to three years between 2009 and 2011, and decreases 
gradually in the next years. The largest differences are found for schools in the smallest 
discontinuity sample of schools across the cutoff. The bottom panel shows the changes in the 
tenure of the teaching staff. In the first years the differences in tenure are less constant than the 
                                                          
17 The estimate for the smallest discontinuity sample in 2007 suggests that the ‘wrong schools’ were treated in this 
year. However, in 2007 non-eligible schools were not treated. The negative estimate can be explained by a special 
pattern of treated and untreated schools at the right side of the cutoff. The untreated schools were schools close to 
the cut-off. If we exclude the forcing variable from the model we find a positive point estimate of 0.37 (0.05).  
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differences in experience and fluctuate around zero. However, since 2008 we also observe that 
the differences in tenure start to increase. In 2010 and 2011 the difference is approximately one 
year. The increases in tenure are smaller than the changes in experience. 
These figures show that the changes in program participation precede and are consistent 
with the changes in experience and tenure across the cut-off. Changes in program participation 
are steeper than changes in experience and tenure. Apparently, it takes some time before teachers 
adjust their school choices upon changes in the program. Figure 4 also shows that the period 
since 2009 is the most interesting period for our analysis. In these years schools that were 
eligible for the program have obtained a more experienced teaching staff than schools that were 
not eligible for the program, and this difference might translate in an improvement of the student 
outcomes. In the earlier years there was not yet a re-allocation of experienced teachers across the 
cut-off. We, therefore, focus our main analysis of the impact of the program on teacher outcomes 
and student outcomes on the years since 2009. 
Next, we proceed by estimating the main models from Section 4. We start by estimating 
Equations (1) to (3) using a 1st-order and 2nd-order specification of the forcing variable, which is 
allowed to be different at either side of the cutoff. The models also control for grade level, year 
and a quadratic for school size. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 2 show the effects on teacher 
experience and columns (4) to (6) show the effects on tenure. The top panel shows the reduced 
form estimates, the middle panel shows the first stage estimates and the bottom panel shows the 
IV-estimates. The estimates are shown for three discontinuity samples around the cut-off for 
program eligibility. To improve the precision of the estimates we have pooled the data over the 
years since 2009. For each year we use data at the grade level, hence the data are at the grade X 
school X year level. We correct the standard errors for clustering at the school X year level, 
which is the level of the treatment18.   
                                                          
18 Schools are treated every year, like in Leuven et al. (2007). 
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The estimates in Table 2 show that the CSCC-program increased the experience of the teaching 
staff in the targeted schools. Program eligibility increased the average experience of the teaching 
staff by two to three years. These estimates are based on a pooled sample of five years and can 
therefore be seen as an average effect over these five years. The largest effects are found for the 
smallest discontinuity samples. This probably reflects the differential effect of the program for 
the two sides of the discontinuity. Schools on the left side of the cut-off lose experience whereas 
schools on the right side of the cut-off gain experience (see also Figure A.2 in the appendix). We 
expect larger effects of the program for schools close to the cut-off if a teacher’s decision to 
switch schools depends on a trade-off between salary and the poverty score of a school. For 
obtaining the salary bonus teachers ‘pay’ a smaller price in terms of a worsening of the poverty 
score of the school if they work in schools close to the cut-off. As mentioned earlier, the 
estimated effects should be interpreted as the combined effect of the changes at both sides of the 
cut-off. The IV-estimates show that the effects of actual participation in the program are even 
larger and vary between three and seven years. For the smallest discontinuity sample we even 
find a larger effect but the first stage estimate might suffer from a weak instrument problem (the 
F-value of the excluded instrument is only 5.9). For the other estimates there are no concerns 
about a weak instrument problem. These IV-estimates should be interpreted as local average 
treatment effects. However, in 2009 and 2010 there was full compliance with the eligibility rules. 
This means that for these years the estimates apply to all eligible schools. 
 The right panel of Table 2 shows the estimates of the effect of the CSCC-program on 
tenure. The sample sizes are slightly different from the left panel because of missing values on 
teacher experience or tenure. The estimates show that the program also increased tenure with 
approximately one year. Moreover, the IV-estimates show that the effect of actual participation 
in the program is larger, and varies between one and two years. Again we find that the estimated 
effects increase when the estimation samples move closer to the cut-off. This is consistent with a 
more favorable trade-off between the salary bonus and a worsening of the poverty score in 
schools close to the cut-off. In addition, all the estimated effects are statistically significant. The 
estimated effects on tenure are smaller than the estimated effects on experience.  
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 The policy could also induce a higher turnover of teachers. We have investigated this by 
looking at teachers that were new at a school (zero years of tenure) using the individual teacher 
data in our database.19 We used this variable as a measure for turnover and analysed the effect of 
the program on the probability that a teacher is new at a school. We performed this analysis for 
each specific year and for the period 2009-2013, which is the main period of our analysis. We 
find that there is more turnover in eligible schools in the years of the implementation of the 
reform (2007 and 2008). For the main period of our analysis (2009-2013) we don’t find a 
difference in turnover; all estimates are small and statistically insignificant. This result also 
implies that the increase in tenure that we have found for this period is not driven by a decrease 
in turnover in these years. The increase in tenure results from a different type of turnover. 
Teachers with more tenure are less likely to leave program schools than to leave non-program 
schools. 
 
Robustness  
The results in Table 2 are robust to different specifications of the forcing variable or to including 
additional controls (Table A.5 in the appendix shows the estimation results). For instance, the 
estimated effects increase when we use a cubic specification of the forcing variable20. Moreover, 
the estimated effects further increase when we use a first order or second order local polynomial 
specification as developed in Calonico et al. (2014)21. For instance, we find that eligibility for the 
CSCC-program increases experience by three to four years and tenure by one to two years in the 
targeted schools. This suggests that a linear specification yields conservative estimates of the 
impact of the program and doesn’t fully pickup what is going on close to the cut-off. Close to the 
cut-off teachers face a more favorable trade-off between the salary bonus and a worsening of the 
poverty score in schools, as pointed out above. The results are also robust to including ‘mothers 
                                                          
19 We cannot directly observe turnover because our database doesn’t have individual teacher identifiers. 
20 Estimates from IV-models without the forcing variable and other controls reveal that the effect of the program 
increases when the discontinuity sample gets smaller. Discontinuity samples of 0.25 or 0.1 yield IV-estimates 
similar to those in columns (3) and (6) in Table 2. 
21 The local polynomial specifications adopt a weighting scheme that puts more weight on observations close to 
the cut-off. 
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with primary education or less in 2005’ and ‘students with unmet basic needs in 2005’ as 
controls. Including pre-treatment measures of experience or tenure increases the estimated 
effects. In addition, the estimated effects are quite similar if we use school-level data instead of 
grade-level data.  
The analysis in Table 2 focuses on the period 2009 until 2013, which are the years in 
which the re-allocation of teachers was most transparent. We have also estimated the effect of 
program eligibility for each specific year since 2005 (see Table A.6 in the appendix). Excluding 
the last years from the estimation sample slightly increases the estimated effects. Including data 
from 2008 in the estimation sample reduces the estimated effects for experience to 1.2 to 1.4 
years and for tenure to 0.3 to 0.6. This reduction of the estimated effects directly follows from 
the timing of the implementation of the program and the zero-effects in 2008, as shown in Figure 
4. These sensitivity analyses suggest that the results in Table 2 are probably conservative 
estimates of the effect of the program on the school choice of teachers.  
Finally, we have also estimated models that include school fixed effects using data for the 
whole period 2005-2013. We also include the first years after the reform of program to fully 
exploit the within school variation in program participation from the implementation years of the 
reform (see Figure 1). We find that program participation on average increases experience with 
1.7 to 1.9 years and tenure with 0.4 to 0.5 years. The fixed effect estimates are smaller than the 
IV-estimates from our RD-models. It should be noted that the fixed effects estimates exploit 
variation within schools whereas the RD-estimates pick up what happens at both sides of the cut-
off. In our application the RD-estimates at the cut-off are expected to be larger because of ‘the 
differential effect of the program’. Due to the program some schools might gain experience and 
some schools might lose experience. The RD-estimates measure the combined effect of the 
changes at both sides of the cut-off.  
In sum, we find that eligibility for and participation in the CSCC-program induced a re-
allocation of experienced teachers towards the targeted schools between 2009 and 2013. The 
estimated effects on teacher experience are large and imply that the school choice of teachers is 
responsive to differences in teacher pay. The program also increases tenure in the targeted 
schools but these effects are smaller than the effects on teacher experience. As experience 
consists of tenure plus experience obtained at other schools this implies that the effect on teacher 
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experience is mainly driven by the hiring of teachers from other schools. Approximately 20 % of 
teachers is new at a school each year; on average 2 to 3 teachers per school. The estimated 
effects imply that each new teacher brings approximately 6 to 12 years additional experience to 
an eligible school.
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6. The effect of the CSCC-program on the performance of students 
The second and most important aim of the program was to improve the educational outcomes of 
students in the disadvantaged areas. In the previous section we have found that the program was 
successful in increasing experience of teachers in schools in the targeted neighborhoods. These 
teachers might be important for the cognitive and non-cognitive development of students in these 
schools. Recent studies show that teachers not only have an impact on test scores but also on 
non-test-score measures that are important for adult outcomes (Jackson, forthcoming; 
Gershenson, 2016; Ladd & Sorenson, 2017). Moreover, improvements on non-test score 
outcomes have been shown to be especially important for students with disadvantaged 
backgrounds like in the context of this study (e.g. Heckman et al. 2013). In this section we 
investigate the effect of the program on student performance using five measures: insufficient 
attendance, grade retention, dropout and test scores in math and language. We start by 
investigating the effect on three non-test scores measures which are available for all grades and 
all schools in Uruguay. Next, we analyze the effect on test scores that are obtained from samples 
of schools. 
 
The effect of the CSCC-program on non-test-score outcomes 
Figure 5 gives a first impression of the effect of the program on the three non-test-score 
measures. The relationship between these three measures of student performance and the poverty 
score of the schools is shown for 2005, 2010 and 2013. For all three outcomes we observe an 
upward sloping trend indicating that schools with higher scores on the poverty index have worse 
student outcomes. Insufficient attendance, grade retention and dropout are more likely in schools 
in poor areas. Most importantly, the figures for 2005 are remarkably similar to those in 2010 and 
2013. There appear to be no major changes in the outcomes for schools at the cut-off. This 
suggests that the policy didn’t have a large effect on student performance in the targeted schools. 
 Figure 6 shows changes in program participation and student outcomes since 1992, which 
is the complete period for which we have data on these outcomes. The Y-axis shows the 
differences between schools at the two sides of the cut-off. To improve comparability, we have 
standardized the student outcome variables with mean zero and standard deviation of one. The 
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top panel, which is similar to the top panel in Figure 4, further illustrates that over a long period 
before 2008 there were no differences in program participation for schools at the cut-off. The 
three figures on student outcomes don’t provide a clear and consistent picture about the impact 
of the program.  Insufficient attendance seems to decline over time, grade retention seems to 
increase over time and drop out seems to be fairly constant. The changes in insufficient 
attendance overlap with the years in which program participation increased. However, the 
decrease in insufficient attendance in 2007 precedes the increase in program participation with 
one year, and precedes the increase in teacher experience with two years. Moreover, the 
reduction in insufficient attendance is sensitive to the discontinuity sample that is used for the 
estimation. Hence, the figure suggest that the program might have had some impact on 
insufficient attendance but probably had no impact on grade retention or drop out. 
Next, we have estimated the main models of Section 4. Table 3 shows the estimates of 
the effect of the program using reduced form and IV-models as specified in Equations (1) to (3). 
The models include a 1st-order or 2nd-order specification of the forcing variable. As in Table 2, 
we have pooled the data over the years since 2009. Columns (1) to (3) show the effects on 
insufficient attendance, columns (4) to (6) show the effects on grade retention and columns (7) to 
(9) show the effects on drop out. The estimation samples are approximately ten percent larger 
than the samples for the teacher outcomes in Table 2 due to missing values on experience or 
tenure.  
The estimates of the effect of the CSCC-program on student outcomes are less clear than 
the estimates of the effect on teacher outcomes22. We don’t find evidence that the program 
reduced grade retention or drop out; all estimated effects of (eligibility for) the CSCC-program 
on grade retention and drop out are statistically insignificant or have the wrong sign. The 
program appears to have some impact on insufficient attendance. We observe that most point 
estimates are negative and some estimates are statistically significant. However, the results are 
sensitive to changes in the specification of the forcing variable. In addition, the effects are not 
consistent across the discontinuity samples and don’t increase when the discontinuity samples 
get smaller, as they did with teacher outcomes. We have also estimated the effect of program 
                                                          
22 It should be noted that the results at the aggregate grade level include any teacher peer effects (Jackson & 
Bruegmann 2009). 
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eligibility for each specific year since 2005 (see Tables A.7 to A.9 in the appendix). These 
estimates do not reveal a clear pattern about the impact of the program on student outcomes. 
We have investigated the robustness of these estimates by performing the same set of 
sensitivity analyses as with the teacher outcomes in the previous section (see Table A.10 in the 
appendix). In general, the estimated effects of the program on student outcomes in these 
robustness analyses are somewhat smaller than the results shown in Tables 3 and 4. For instance, 
estimates from models that use a cubic specification or models that use local polynomial 
specifications as in Calonico et al. (2014) are smaller and often statistically insignificant.  
Moreover, we have also checked whether the results are different when we adjust the sample size 
for missing values on experience or tenure as in Table 2. The estimation results for these smaller 
samples are quite similar. 
We further investigated the effectiveness of the program by looking at differences 
between grades and by constructing a more detailed attendance variable. The effects of the 
program might differ among grades as previous studies have found that teacher experience is 
especially important in early grades. For instance Krueger (1999), Chetty et al. (2011) and 
Gerritsen et al. (2017) have found larger effects of teacher experience for students in 
kindergarten. A further advantage of looking specifically at earlier grades is that there is more 
variation in the outcome variables. However, the estimates for early and later grades also don’t 
provide clear support for the effectiveness of the program (see Table A.11). The program seems 
to reduce grade retention in the early grades but also seems to increase grade retention in the 
other grades. Moreover, the program seems to reduce drop out in grades three to six but this 
result is sensitive to the specification and discontinuity sample. The effects on insufficient 
attendance are found through all grades but the estimated effects are larger for the early grades, 
which is consistent with previous findings about the effectiveness of experienced teachers. Again 
these results are sensitive to the specification and restrictions about the discontinuity sample. The 
estimated effects for the higher grades are smaller. 23  
To improve the precision of our estimates we have constructed an additional outcome 
variable about school attendance. This variable is based on the two previous measures 
                                                          
23 The data also allow us to separately investigate the effects of the program on male and female grade retention. We 
find that the effects for boys and girls are similar to those reported in Table 4. 
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‘insufficient attendance’ and ‘dropout’, and on additional information about the number of days 
that students attended school. This information allows us to construct a more detailed measure of 
attendance (see Section 3). The estimates of the effect on this new attendance measure confirm 
the previous findings (Table A.12). The CSCC-program appears to increase student attendance, 
especially for students in early grades, but the results are sensitive to the specification of the 
forcing variable and restrictions on the discontinuity samples.  
Furthermore, we have investigated the impact of years in the program. It might be 
possible that the impact of the program on students will not be immediate, or might depend on 
the intensity of the treatment (number of years in the treated state). The results based on IV-
models in which the number of treatment years is instrumented with program eligibility are 
consistent with the previous IV-estimates, and don’t provide clear evidence about the 
effectiveness of the program. 
 
The effect of the CSCC-program on Test Scores 
Our second data source, the National Evaluation of Learning project (see Section 3), provides 
data on test scores that have been collected in representative samples of schools in  1999, 2002 
and 2009. Students in grade 6 had to take standardized tests in math and language (see Section 
3). To fully exploit these data we use two features in our analysis. First, we use the variation 
induced by the eligibility rules of the CSCC-program in 2005. As in the previous analysis, we 
investigate the effect of the CSCC-program on the cognitive achievement scores by estimating 
the reduced form model as specified in Equation (1). As there was full compliance in 2009 the 
reduced form estimates are equal to the IV-estimates. Second, we use the time dimension of our 
data within a difference-in-differences framework24. This allows us to observe whether the 
relative performance of students at the right side of the cut-off has changed over time. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the estimated effects on math and language test scores for each 
specific year of the data collection, and for the pooled sample of three years used in the 
                                                          
24 The second difference is whether the tests were taken before or after the redesigning of the CSCC-program in 
2005. 
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difference-in-differences approach. Again we use discontinuity samples of schools across the 
cutoff. The estimation samples are smaller than in the previous analysis as test scores are only 
available for a sample of schools and not for the whole population. We, therefore, also show the 
results for the full sample. The rows show the effects of being eligible for the program in 2005 
on test scores using different specifications of the forcing variable. Test scores have been 
standardized with mean zero and standard deviation of one.  
We start by looking at the results for 2009. In this year all schools in our sample at the 
right side of the cut-off and no schools at the left side of the cut-off participated in the program. 
The estimates of the effect of the program are all statistically insignificant and nearly all point 
estimates are  negative. The results for the language test, shown in Table 5, are quite similar and 
also don’t yield evidence for a positive effect of the CSCC-program on test scores in 2009. Next, 
we look at the changes in relative performance of students at the right side of the cut-off over 
time. The difference in test scores across the cut-off in 1999 and 2002 appears to be different 
from the difference we observed in 2009. All point estimates are positive and we also find one 
statistically significant effect, indicating that students at the right side of the cut-off performed 
better in these years than schools at the left side of the cut-off. The difference-in-differences 
estimates summarize the changes in relative performance of students in schools at the right side 
of the cut-off over time. We find that all point estimates are negative and some point estimates 
have p-values close to the regular significance levels. Again, the results for the language test, 
shown in Table 5, are quite similar. Hence, these estimates don’t provide evidence that the 
relative performance of students in schools at the right side of the cut-off has improved. 
 
In sum: the effect of the program on student outcomes 
In this section we have investigated the effect of the program on five measures of student 
performance. The estimates of the effects on non-test-score measures don’t provide a compelling 
case for the effectiveness of the program on student outcomes. We don’t find evidence that the 
program reduced grade retention or school dropout. The program appears to increase school 
attendance, especially the attendance of students in grades 1 and 2, but the results are sensitive to 
the specification of the forcing variable. In addition, the estimates of the effects on test scores in 
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math and language also don’t show that the CSCC-program improved the achievements of 
students. Both the regression discontinuity estimates for 2009 as the difference-in-differences 
estimates don’t provide evidence for a positive impact of the program on cognitive test scores. If 
anything, the relative performance of students at the right side of the cut-off appears to be worse 
in 2009 than in previous years. Based on these results, and even without adjustment for multiple 
testing, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the program had no effect on student outcomes. 
The consistency of these results across a range of non-test-score measures and test-score 
outcomes leads us to conclude that the impact of the CSCC-program on student performance is 
likely to be quite small.  
 
7. Mechanisms: why are the effects on student performance modest? 
We have found that the CSCC-program has a large effect on experience of the teaching staff of 
schools in poor neighborhoods and also increases tenure in these schools. On average in each 
class within each grade the experience of the teacher increased with two to three years. The 
corresponding treatment on the treated effects are between three and seven years. Moreover, this 
difference in the experience of the teaching staff across the cut-off for program eligibility stayed 
on for several years. However, we have also found that the effects on student performance 
appear to be modest. This raises the question why the increase of experience did not have a 
substantial effect on student performance.  
 
Hiring or keeping teachers? 
The experience of the teaching staff of schools can increase by hiring more experienced teachers 
from other schools or by reducing teacher turnover, and thereby increasing tenure of teachers at 
the current school. This distinction between experience obtained at the current school (tenure) 
and experience obtained at other schools might play a role in explaining the modest effect of the 
program. The CSCC-program can have a different effect on these two components of experience.  
If the program is especially important for the experience component that is less important for 
student outcomes this would explain the modest effect. For instance, a recent study finds that 
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specific experience of teachers has a larger impact on test score improvement than general 
experience of teachers (Ost 2014)25.  
 Since the seminal studies by Abraham & Farber (1987), Altonji & Shakotko (1987) and 
Topel (1991) it is well established that the wage returns to tenure exceed the wage returns to 
experience obtained in other firms. This difference in returns might result from firm specific 
human capital, but also from unobserved factors related to worker quality, job quality or match 
quality. The context of this study is quite different due to the specific characteristics of the 
teacher labor market in Uruguay. First, teachers can, based on their experience, choose a school 
where they would like to work at, independent of their teaching qualities. Hence, the decision on 
staying in the same job or moving to a new job is likely to be less dependent on unobserved 
quality factors than in previous studies. Second, the dynamics of the teacher labor market affect 
the decision about staying at the same school in a special way. With each year of additional 
experience a teacher has the opportunity to move to a school with a (slightly) ‘better’ student 
population. More years of tenure implies that a teacher doesn’t take the opportunities to move to 
a ‘better’ school but instead remains ‘loyal’ to the current school. This means that more years of 
tenure could reflect a stronger commitment to a school and it’s students.  
For investigating the difference between ‘hiring’ and ‘keeping’ teachers we have 
decomposed ‘total experience’ in ‘years of tenure’ and ‘years of experience at other schools’ 
(total experience= tenure + experience obtained at other schools)26. Table 6 shows reduced form 
estimates of the effect of the CSCC-program on these two components of experience. The left 
panel shows the estimates on tenure which are equal to the estimates in the right panel of 
Table 2. The right panel shows the estimates on experience obtained at other schools. 
The estimates in Table 6 show that the program affected both components of experience. 
However, the impact on experience obtained at other schools is larger, especially in the two 
discontinuity samples closest to the cut-off for program eligibility.  
In Tables 7 and 8 we investigate the relationship between the two experience components 
and student outcomes. Both tables show estimates from regressions of student outcomes on ‘total 
                                                          
25 This study looks at grade specific experience and also at the timing of the experience components (recent or 
distant). 
26 The seminal study by Abraham & Farber (1987) applies the same decomposition. 
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experience’ or on the two components of ‘total experience’ (tenure or experience obtained at 
other schools). Table 7 shows the estimates using non-test-score measures as outcomes, Table 8 
shows the estimates using test scores as outcomes. 
The estimates in Table 7, and especially those in Table 8, reveal a remarkable pattern. 
First, experience has a small, and mostly statistical insignificant, association with (better) student 
outcomes. Second, tenure appears to be much more important, especially for insufficient 
attendance and for test scores in math and language. More years of tenure decrease insufficient 
attendance and improve test scores in math and language. The size of the estimates of the effects 
of tenure is much larger than the size of the estimates for total experience, and the estimates are 
statistically significant. Also note, that these results are robust to including grade by school fixed 
effects (Table 7). Third, increases in experience obtained at other schools don’t improve student 
outcomes or even decrease student performance. Hence, the estimates for the two underlying 
components of experience are very different, especially for test scores. We also find that nearly 
all tests on the similarity of the estimates for the two experience components reject the null 
hypothesis that the estimates are equal. Hence, the estimates in Tables 7 and 8 suggest that tenure 
is important for student performance and that experience obtained at other schools doesn’t 
contribute or is even detrimental to student performance.  
 The results in Tables 7 and 8 are based on associations and should not be interpreted as  
causal relationships between the experience components and student performance. Tenure and 
experience at other schools might be correlated with unobserved components that also have an 
impact on student outcomes. For instance, teacher decisions on staying at the same school or 
moving to other schools might be related with unobserved factors like commitment to a school 
and it’s students. Hence, the results not only reflect the impact of the experience components but 
also the impact of unobserved factors that are correlated with these components. The consistency 
of the results across different outcomes and discontinuity samples is remarkable, and suggests 
that increases in tenure and increases in ‘experience obtained at other schools’ have a different 
effect on student performance. 
 These analyses on experience components yield two results. First, the CSCC-program 
especially affects ‘experience obtained at other schools’. Second, experience obtained at other 
schools appears not to contribute to student performance, whereas tenure seems to be important 
for student outcomes. Keeping teachers appears to be more beneficial for students than hiring 
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teachers. This suggests that the CSCC-program especially has an impact on the experience 
component that appears not to be important for student performance.  
 
Does the policy affect the relevant parts of the experience distribution? 
A second argument for explaining the modest effect of the program might come from the 
changes in the experience distribution. In a recent study Hendricks (2014) summarizes what is 
known about the relationship between teacher experience and student achievement. ‘The 
evidence suggests that teachers improve with experience, in terms of their value-added to student 
performance on standardized exams’. ‘Teacher performance improves dramatically in the first 
four years of teaching and then levels off in subsequent years.’ This implies that the impact of 
the CSCC-program on student performance not only depends on the increase in average 
experience of the teaching staff in the targeted schools but also on the changes in the experiences 
distribution within schools that are affected. The program would be most effective if it especially 
replaces new teachers with experienced teachers (4+ years of experience). However, if the 
program replaces experienced teachers with even more experienced teachers we would expect a 
much smaller impact on student performance.  
 The individual teacher data in our database allow us to investigate the changes in the 
experience distributions of teachers in schools. Figure 7 shows the density functions of 
experience in schools in the smallest discontinuity sample around the cut-off in 2005 and in 
2010. In 2005 the density functions for the two samples of schools around the cut-off are quite 
similar but schools that are eligible for the program have slightly more teachers with less than ten 
years of experience and have slightly less teachers with more than ten years of experience. In 
2010 this pattern has reversed. Schools that are eligible for the program have less teachers with 
less than ten years of experience and have more teachers with more than 10 years of experience. 
This means that the program has affected the whole distribution of experience including both the 
early stages of the career as the later stages of the career.  
To further assess the importance of the changes in the experience distribution we have 
estimated the effect of the program on ‘the most relevant parts of this distribution’. We 
constructed dummies for specific parts of the experience distribution; 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-
24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-40 years of experience. Next, we estimated linear probability models of the 
effect of the program on these specific parts of the experience distribution. Table 9 shows the 
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estimation results. Each row shows the effect of a separate regression of a dummy for an 
experience category on eligibility for the program and a set of controls. The left panel of Table 9 
shows the estimates for 200627, the right panel shows the estimates for the period 2009-2013.  
In the left panel of Table 9 we observe that there were only small differences in the 
experience categories between schools across the cut-off. In the period 2009-2013 we observe a 
different pattern. Teachers with no more than 10 years of experience are less likely to work at 
schools that were eligible for the CSCC-program. On the other hand, teachers with 11 to 20 years 
of experience are more likely to work in schools at the right side of the cut-off. The other 
experience categories remained largely unchanged. This means that the program induced 
replacements of teachers with no more than 10 years of experience by teachers with 11 to 20 
years of experience. This pattern of replacements seems quite efficient considering the recent 
literature on the productivity-experience profile of teachers. This literature suggest that replacing 
teachers from the first experience category by more experienced teachers is most efficient. The 
CSCC-program also replaces teachers from the second experience category which is less 
efficient. The latter effect is expected to weaken the impact of the program on student 
performance.  
We further examined this hypothesis in two ways. First, by looking at grades in eligible 
schools that had a relatively large or relatively small reduction in the proportion of ‘rookie 
teachers’ (less than 5 years of experience). For this analysis we have split the sample of grades in 
eligible schools in two parts: grades that increased the proportion of ‘rookie teachers’ between 
2005 and 2010, the last year with full compliance with the program, and grades that did not 
increase the proportion of ‘rookie teachers’. Next, we re-estimated the reduced form models 
from Table 3 for both samples for all grades and for the early grades. The results are shown in 
Table 10. We find that the results are better for the sample of grades that reduced the proportion 
of ‘rookie teachers’ between 2005 and 2010. For this sample the program reduced ‘insufficient 
attendance’ for all students, and especially for students in grades 1 and 2. We find similar results 
when we split the sample in a different way: grades in eligible schools that had ‘rookie teachers 
in 2005’ versus grades in eligible schools that had no ‘rookie teachers’ in 2005. Moreover, we 
find similar results for the additional outcome variable about school attendance constructed from 
                                                          
27 We don’t use the data of 2005 because of a difference in the coding of the experience categories. This changed in 
2006. 
36 
 
‘insufficient attendance’, ‘drop out’ and information about the number of days students attended 
school. 
Second, we estimated the effect of changing the proportion of teachers on student 
outcomes for each experience category from Table 9 in a model that includes school fixed effects 
and uses data for the whole period 2005-2013. These estimates provide insight in the effect of 
replacing teachers from a specific experience category in grades within schools. The results are 
shown in Table 11 and Table A.13 in the appendix (grades 1-2). The estimates indicate that 
replacements of teachers in the three categories with the least experience are associated with 
improvements of student outcomes. Student outcomes are especially sensitive to changes in the 
‘rookie category’. Moreover, replacements of teachers in the other categories are associated with 
deteriorations of student outcomes. Student outcomes appear to be most sensitive to changes in 
experience between 15 and 30 years. The analysis for grades 1 and 2 also yields interesting 
results (Table A.13). Student outcomes improve after replacing teachers in the first two 
categories (0-4 years; 5-9 years), and deteriorate from replacing teachers in the next two 
categories (10-14; 15-19 years). The outcomes are less sensitive to changes in categories with the 
most experience, and even appear to improve from replacements in the ‘30-34 years’ category.    
These findings indicate that the experience effect is not linear. Moreover, this suggests 
that the program could become more effective if it focused on replacing ‘rookie teachers’. 
 
Does the policy affect the student enrolment of schools?  
A third potential explanation for the modest results of the program could be related with changes 
in the enrolment of students. Although the CSCC-program explicitly focused on changes in the 
teaching staff it might also have affected the targeted schools along other margins. For instance, 
the hiring of more experienced teachers might have made these schools more attractive for 
students and their parents. An increase in school size might have reduced student performance 
through larger classes. Moreover, changes in the socioeconomic background of students might 
also have an impact on student performance. It should be noted that changes in the enrolment of 
students are limited by the application of fixed catchment areas in primary education in Uruguay. 
We investigate whether the CSCC-program had an impact on school size and on the 
socioeconomic background of students for the most relevant period of the program. We estimate 
the main models from the previous sections, and use as dependent variables school size and two 
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indicators of socioeconomic background of students; proportions of students in need of lunch or 
supper at school. The need of lunch or supper at school indicates poverty at home; both variables 
have five categories: 0%, 0-24%, 25-49 %, 50-74 %, 75-100%, and are measured yearly at the 
school-level. 
The top panel of Table 12 shows the impact of being eligible for the program on school 
size. Note that in our specification we control for school size in 2005, which implies that the 
estimates measure the increase of schools size since the redesigning of the program. The 
estimates from models that use a linear specification of the forcing variable suggest a small 
increase in school size. The estimated effects of 3 to 9 students imply an increase of class size 
with 0.25 to 0.75 students as schools on average have 12 groups. The estimates that use a 
quadratic specification don’t indicate an increase of schools. The bottom panel shows the effects 
on the proportions of students that need lunch or supper at school. We don’t observe a clear 
pattern for the first indicator (lunch). The estimates for the second indicator suggest that the 
proportion of students in need of supper at school is somewhat smaller in schools that were 
eligible for the program. This suggests that the poverty rate of students in schools at the right 
side of the cutoff is somewhat lower than in schools at the left side of the cut-off. Hence, we 
don’t find that the proportion of disadvantaged students has increased due to the program. These 
analysis on changes in enrolment of students don’t provide evidence that the program affected 
the targeted schools along other margins in such a way that it could explain the modest results of 
the program.  
 
8. Conclusion and discussion 
This study investigates the effects of a policy program aimed at attracting more experienced and 
better qualified teachers in primary schools in poor neighborhoods in Uruguay. Teachers could 
earn substantially higher salaries by working in these schools. The program also includes several 
non-salary components but these components appear to be less important for schools at the cut-
off for treatment assignment. We find that the program was successful in increasing experience 
of teachers in schools in the targeted neighborhoods. Estimates from regression discontinuity 
models show large effects on the teaching staff in the targeted schools. For the period 2009-2013 
the policy on average increased the experience of the teaching staff with two to three years and 
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tenure with one year. Estimates of the treatment on the treated effect indicate effects of three to 
seven years of experience and one to two year of tenure.  
 Despite this substantial change in the composition of the teaching staff the impact on 
student performance appears to be small. We have investigated the impact of the program on a 
range of non-test-score outcomes and on test scores. Even without adjustment for multiple 
testing it is difficult to reject the null hypothesis that the program doesn’t influence student 
outcomes. We find some evidence that the program increased the attendance of students, 
especially the attendance of students in grades 1 and 2. However, these results are not robust to 
the specification of the forcing variable or to the discontinuity sample that is used for the 
estimation. We don’t find an effect of the program on grade retention or drop out, nor on test 
scores in math and language. This leads us to conclude that the effects of the CSCC-program on 
student outcomes are likely to be quite small.  
 The modest results might be explained by two factors. First, the CSCC-program 
especially affects the hiring of experienced teachers from other schools. This appears to be the 
component of experience that is less relevant for student performance. Second, we find that the 
program induces replacement of teachers who are on the steepest part of the productivity-
experience profile, but also replaces teachers who are on parts of the productivity-profile that are 
less steep. The latter replacements are expected to be less efficient, and thereby probably reduce 
the impact of the program. Moreover, we find that the effects of the program are better for 
schools that had more replacements of teachers with less than five years of experience. 
 
 This paper shows that the school choice of teachers is sensitive to variation in teacher 
pay. Schools in disadvantaged areas can attract or keep more experienced teachers by offering 
higher salaries. However, the impact of a general and unconditional increase of teacher salaries 
on student performance appears to be small. Our empirical analysis yield some suggestions for 
the design of the program that might improve the effectiveness. First, by focusing the program 
on ‘keeping teachers’ instead of ‘hiring teachers from other schools’. Second, by focusing the 
program on early grades in primary education. Third, by focusing the program on replacing 
teachers with less than five years of experience.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Participation of schools in the CSCC-program by poverty score 2005-
2010
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Figure 2. Balancing tests for pre-treatment outcomes and characteristics in 2005 
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Figure 3. Teacher experience and tenure by poverty score in 2005, 2010 and 2013 
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Figure 4. Differences in program participation, experience and tenure for schools at the cut-off 
using three discontinuity samples 2002-2013 
 
Notes: The figures show point estimates from  regression-discontinuity models  with a linear specification of the 
forcing variable and controlling for grade, year and a quadratic of school size. The three discontinuity samples used 
are +/- 1.5, +/- 1.0 and +/- 0.5 points of the running variable.
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Figure 5. Student outcomes by poverty score in 2005, 2010 and 2013 
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Figure 6. Differences in program participation, insufficient attendance, grade retention and drop 
out for schools at the cut-off using three discontinuity samples 1995-2013 
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Figure 7.  Experience distributions in 2005 and in 2010 by program eligibility  
individual teacher data) 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 - Summary statistics of schools by program eligibility in 2005 
 
All schools   
 
Not eligible Eligible Difference 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
mean st. dev. mean st. dev. T-stat sign  
 Panel A: Families and schools             
 Poverty score -0.79 (0.55) 0.85 (0.65) 34.15 *** 
 Mothers with primary education or less 35.74 (15.87) 61.68 (12.63) 23.35 ***  
Children with unmet basic needs 28.20 (14.53) 58.08 (14.11) 26.56 ***  
Number of students 315 (162.43) 318 (187.80) 0.21   
 Number of teachers 11.04 (4.92) 11.38 (5.85) 0.80   
 Number of groups 11.32 (4.43) 11.67 (5.22) 0.92   
 Panel B: Teacher outcomes             
 Experience (in years) 14.30 (5.21) 12.20 (5.07) -4.95 *** 
 Tenure (in years at current school) 5.98 (2.85) 4.72 (2.59) -5.66 *** 
 Panel C: Student outcomes             
 Insufficient Attendance 5.27 (3.48) 9.17 (6.13) 9.61 *** 
 Grade Retention 6.58 (3.56) 10.41 (4.81) 11.25 *** 
 Dropouts 0.65 (0.90) 1.41 (1.64) 7.11 *** 
 School climate: Verbal violence 0.43 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49) 4.00 *** 
 School climate: Physical violence 0.39 (0.49) 0.55 (0.50) 4.23 *** 
 Panel E: Observations             
 # Schools 374 284     
 # Grades 2,295 1,752     
 Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. T-statistic of the difference in means.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2. Estimates of the effect of the CSCC program on experience and tenure 2009-2013 
  Teacher experience Tenure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Discontinuity sample  +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
       
Reduced form       
1st-order polynomial 1.686*** 1.526*** 1.873*** 0.403** 0.737*** 0.657**  
  (0.304) (0.359) (0.501) (0.191) (0.220) (0.297) 
2nd-order polynomial  1.703*** 2.315*** 3.344*** 0.989*** 0.640** 1.477*** 
 (0.449) (0.546) (0.726) (0.261) (0.314) (0.387)  
       
First stage       
1st-order polynomial 0.573*** 0.481*** 0.364*** 0.572*** 0.482*** 0.361*** 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.059) (0.029) (0.037) (0.058) 
2nd-order polynomial 0.387*** 0.315*** 0.234** 0.388*** 0.314*** 0.233** 
 (0.049) (0.062) (0.096) (0.049) (0.062) (0.096) 
       
Second stage       
1st-order polynomial 2.877*** 3.213*** 5.135*** 0.692** 1.542*** 1.806** 
 (0.536) (0.749) (1.493) (0.338) (0.476) (0.889) 
2nd-order polynomial  4.320*** 7.186*** 13.038** 2.462*** 1.993* 5.868** 
  (1.165) (2.048) (5.153) (0.741) (1.089) (2.821) 
       
Observations 13,749 10,341 5,868 13,878 10,441 5,920 
Schools  543 413 235 543 413 235 
Notes: Eligibility for the program since 2005 is used as instrument for participation in the program. All models 
control for grade, year and a quadratic of school size. Data used are at the grade by year level. Discontinuity samples 
based on standard deviations of the poverty score across the cut-off. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the 
school X year level. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1, 5 or 10 %-level.   
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Table 3. Estimates of the effect of the CSCC program on student outcomes 2009-2013 (pooled data) 
  Insufficient Attendance Grade Retention Drop Out 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Discontinuity sample  +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
Reduced form          
1st-order polynomial -0.052 -0.153*** -0.093 0.014 -0.007 0.132* 0.039 -0.056 -0.066  
  (0.046) (0.055) (0.076) (0.038) (0.047) (0.067) (0.061) (0.066) (0.045) 
2nd-order polynomial  -0.252*** -0.108 0.080 -0.081 0.001 -0.008 -0.079 -0.015 -0.155 
 (0.071) (0.086) (0.115) (0.060) (0.075) (0.107) (0.061) (0.055) (0.140)  
          
IV-estimates          
1st-order polynomial -0.095 -0.316*** -0.255 0.026 -0.011 0.361* 0.068 -0.115 -0.183 
 (0.084) (0.117) (0.214) (0.069) (0.097) (0.187) (0.110) (0.138) (0.128) 
2nd-order polynomial  -0.620*** -0.346 0.278 -0.198 0.005 0.004 -0.189 -0.056 -0.619 
  (0.194) (0.268) (0.464) (0.152) (0.224) (0.427) (0.157) (0.168) (0.608) 
Observations  15288 11577 6599 15297 11583 6602 15289 11576 6599 
Schools 543 413 235 543 413 235 543 413 235 
Notes: Eligibility for the program since 2005 is used as instrument for participation in the program. All models controls for grade, year and a quadratic of school 
size. Data used are at the grade by year level. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the school X year level. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1, 5 or 10 
%-level.   
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Table 4. Estimates of the effect of the CSCC program on Math Test Scores in 1999, 2002 and 2009 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Discontinuity sample  All +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 All +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
   
 2009 2002 
1st-order polynomial 0.017 -0.084 -0.228 0.109 0.166 0.223 0.251 0.572 
  (0.123) (0.147) (0.172) (0.252) (0.170) (0.190) (0.232) (0.354) 
2nd-order polynomial  -0.160 -0.126 -0.093 -0.208 0.339 0.378 0.527 0.459 
 (0.173) (0.206) (0.248) (0.332) (0.257) (0.301) (0.371) (0.439) 
         
Observations 3,383 2,641 1,474 880 3,985 3,555 2,691 1,491 
Schools 119 95 63 37 137 121 92 53 
         
 1999 Difference-in-differences 
1st-order polynomial 0.040 0.109 0.158 0.375* -0.131 -0.069 -0.082 -0.190 
 (0.112) (0.126) (0.138) (0.195) (0.089) (0.091) (0.114) (0.146) 
2nd-order polynomial  0.179 0.220 0.233 0.316 -0.136 -0.090 -0.071 -0.214 
  (0.141) (0.165) (0.190) (0.313) (0.090) (0.088) (0.113) (0.142) 
          
Observations  4,302 3,681 3,074 1,739 11,670 9,877 7,239 4,110 
Schools 132 111 91 52 312 267 202 116 
Notes: Estimates from reduced form models. All models control for age and gender The difference-in-difference estimates compare test score before and after 
2005 and across the cutoff for program eligibility. The number of schools is this analysis is smaller than the sum of schools over the years because some schools 
participated in more than one year. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the school level. 
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Table 5. Estimates of the effect of the CSCC program on Language Test Scores 1999, 2002 and 2009 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Discontinuity sample  All +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 All +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
    
 2009 2002 
1st-order polynomial -0.004 -0.094 -0.147 0.145 0.201 0.190 0.193 0.417  
  (0.100) (0.120) (0.152) (0.193) (0.149) (0.171) (0.202) (0.296) 
2nd-order polynomial  -0.112 -0.035 -0.017 0.012 0.232 0.284 0.408 0.545 
 (0.146) (0.177) (0.195) (0.222) (0.221) (0.254) (0.308) (0.404)  
         
Observations 3,383 2,641 1,474 880 3,988 3,552 2,687 1,488 
Schools 119 95 63 37 137 121 92 53 
          
 1999 Difference-in-differences 
1st-order polynomial -0.029 -0.003 0.007 0.177 -0.114 -0.081 -0.090 -0.131  
 (0.109) (0.126) (0.146) (0.224) (0.073) (0.078) (0.098) (0.125)  
2nd-order polynomial  0.054 0.036 -0.061 -0.172 -0.117 -0.098 -0.084 -0.145 
  (0.155) (0.181) (0.229) (0.332) (0.074) (0.077) (0.097) (0.123) 
          
Observations  4,323 3,691 3,077 1,750 11,996 10,116 7,381 4,187 
Schools 132 111 91 52 312 267 202 116  
Notes: see Table 4
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Table 6. Estimates of the effect of the CSCC program on tenure and experience at other schools  
  Tenure Experience at other schools 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Discontinuity sample  +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
       
1st-order polynomial 0.403** 0.737*** 0.657** 1.254*** 0.819*** 1.188***  
  (0.191) (0.220) (0.297) (0.248) (0.298) (0.435) 
2nd-order polynomial  0.989*** 0.640** 1.477*** 0.728* 1.573*** 1.726*** 
 (0.261) (0.314) (0.387) (0.381) (0.472) (0.662)  
       
Observations 13,878 10,441 5,920 13,749 10,341 5,868  
Schools  543 413 235 543 413 235 
Notes: Data used from 2009-2013 as in Table 2. Estimates from reduced form models as in Table 2.   
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Table 7. Estimates of the effect of experience components on student outcomes 2009-2013 (pooled data) 
  Insufficient Attendance Grade Retention Drop Out 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1st-order polynomial  +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
Total experience -0.003*** -0.003** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
           
Tenure  -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.004* -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.003* -0.001 -0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Experience at other schools 0.003* 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.000 0.001  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
2nd-order polynomial           
Total experience -0.003*** -0.003** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  
           
Tenure -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.004* -0.002* -0.001 0.002 -0.003* -0.001 -0.003**  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Experience at other schools  0.003* 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fixed Effects           
Total experience  -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.001 0.000 0.003* -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
           
Tenure  -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.013*** 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Experience at other schools  -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.004** -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 13,295 9,982 5,659 13,304 9,988 5,662 13,296 9,981 5,659 
Notes: All models controls for grade, year, a quadratic of school size and the forcing variable which is allowed to be different across the cut-off. Data used are at 
the grade by year level. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the school X year level. Fixed effects models include fixed effects for grades within schools. 
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Table 8. Estimates of the effect of the experience components on test scores in 2009 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Discontinuity sample  All +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 All +/- 1.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 0.5 
1st-order polynomial Math Language 
Total experience 0.009 0.004 0.015 0.014 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) 
         
Tenure 0.039*** 0.037** 0.061*** 0.060* 0.025** 0.025** 0.039** 0.019 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.030) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.029) 
Experience at other schools -0.009 -0.019 -0.018 -0.015 -0.007 -0.009 -0.011 0.010 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.020) 
          
2nd-order polynomial         
Total experience 0.009 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.019) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) 
         
Tenure 0.039*** 0.037** 0.057*** 0.075* 0.026** 0.026** 0.032* 0.023 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.043) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.035) 
Experience at other schools -0.009 -0.018 -0.020* -0.016 -0.008 -0.007 -0.015 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.022) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) 
         
Observations  3,108 2,366 1,263 690 3,389 2,577 1,387 741 
Notes: Estimates from reduced form models. All models control for age and gender. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the school level. 
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Table 9. Reduced form estimates of the effect of the CSCC program on ‘relevant experience’ 
    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Discontinuity sample  +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
       
Teacher experience: 2006 2009-2013 
0-4 years -0.010 0.023 -0.019 -0.058*** -0.083*** -0.076**  
  (0.045) (0.055) (0.071) (0.020) (0.023) (0.031) 
5-9 years -0.031 -0.034 -0.045 -0.035** -0.055*** -0.095***  
 (0.039) (0.049) (0.070) (0.016) (0.020) (0.027) 
10-14 years 0.086*** 0.097*** 0.078 0.057*** 0.060*** 0.001 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.050) (0.015) (0.019) (0.026) 
15-19 years 0.025 -0.008 0.014 0.038*** 0.064*** 0.096*** 
 (0.027) (0.032) (0.043) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) 
20-24 years -0.017 0.005 0.040 -0.001 -0.008 0.015 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.036) (0.010) (0.013) (0.019) 
25-29 years -0.057** -0.063** -0.046 0.007 0.008 0.016 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.037) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) 
30-34 years -0.012 -0.027 0.009 -0.010 -0.007 0.002 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.036) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) 
35-40 years -0.002 -0.003 -0.013 0.006 0.006 0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
       
Observations 5,974 4,396 2,459 29,099 21,146 13,878 
Notes: Based on data from individual teachers. Estimates from linear probability models of a dummy for the 
experience category on program eligibility, a quadratic specification of the forcing variable, grade, year, school size 
and school size squared. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the school X year level. 
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Table 10. Reduced form estimates of the effect of the CSCC program on student outcomes 2009-2013 for grades in eligible schools 
that reduced or didn’t reduce the proportion of teachers with less than 5 years of experience 
  Insufficient Attendance Grade Retention Drop Out 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Discontinuity sample  +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
All grades          
Grades that reduced % of rookie teachers -0.125** -0.174*** -0.183** -0.019 0.008 0.272*** 0.079 -0.069 -0.153** 
 (0.052) (0.060) (0.084) (0.052) (0.063) (0.089) (0.125) (0.132) (0.062) 
Observations  11,497 8,706 4,847 11,502 8,711 4,849 11,497 8,707 4,848 
Grades that didn’t reduce % of rookie teachers  0.014 -0.133** -0.015 0.027 -0.020 0.018 -0.006 -0.050 -0.012 
  (0.054) (0.065) (0.090) (0.041) (0.048) (0.068) (0.034) (0.037) (0.049) 
Observations  12,776 9,504 5,343 12,784 9,509 5,346 12,781 9,506 5,344 
          
Grades 1-2          
Grades that reduced % of rookie teachers -0.286*** -0.284*** -0.309*** -0.292*** -0.209** 0.157 0.076 -0.126 -0.113 
 (0.077) (0.083) (0.109) (0.089) (0.106) (0.139) (0.141) (0.152) (0.097) 
Observations 3,837 2,916 1,62 3,837 2,916 1,62 3,836 2,916 1,62 
Grades that didn’t reduce % of rookie teachers 0.019 -0.199** -0.041 0.021 -0.036 0.027 0.029 -0.094 0.036 
 (0.079) (0.094) (0.136) (0.070) (0.083) (0.122) (0.051) (0.067) (0.088) 
Observations 4,260 3,159 1,777 4,260 3,159 1,777 4,259 3,158 1,776 
Notes: The first rows only include grades in eligible schools that reduced the proportion of rookie teachers at the right side of the cut-off. The next rows only 
include grades in eligible schools at the right side of the cut-off that didn’t reduce the proportion of rookie teachers. All models control for grade, year and a 
quadratic of school size, and use a first order polynomial of poverty score. Data used are at the grade by year level. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the 
school X year level. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1, 5 or 10 %-level.   
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Table 11. Fixed effect estimates of the effect of experience on student outcomes 2005-2013 (pooled data) , all grades 
  Insufficient Attendance Grade Retention Drop Out 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Discontinuity sample  +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
Teacher experience (%):          
0-4 years 0.078*** 0.065*** 0.055*** 0.016 0.024* -0.007 0.037** 0.046*** 0.018 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) 
5-9 years 0.024 0.020 0.013 0.030** 0.032** 0.030 -0.015 -0.015 0.007 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) 
10-14 years -0.018 -0.011 -0.034 0.033** 0.019 0.025 0.023 0.013 0.039* 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) 
15-19 years -0.075*** -0.062*** -0.023 0.003 0.010 0.029 -0.058*** -0.073*** -0.050* 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.031) (0.018) (0.020) (0.027) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) 
20-24 years -0.051** -0.059** -0.075** -0.052*** -0.061*** -0.042 -0.013 0.002 -0.009 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.035) (0.019) (0.023) (0.031) (0.024) (0.027) (0.030) 
24-29 years -0.052** -0.045* -0.018 -0.068*** -0.063*** -0.051* -0.011 -0.009 -0.027 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.036) (0.019) (0.023) (0.031) (0.024) (0.027) (0.031) 
30-34 years -0.013 -0.007 0.016 -0.060** -0.067** -0.062* -0.008 -0.005 -0.031 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.043) (0.024) (0.028) (0.038) (0.029) (0.033) (0.037) 
35-39 years -0.013 0.029 0.047 -0.044 -0.086 -0.048 -0.002 -0.034 -0.180** 
 (0.066) (0.076) (0.098) (0.056) (0.066) (0.086) (0.069) (0.080) (0.085) 
Observations 25,053 18,923 10,687 25,062 18,929 10,690 25,051 18,919 10,686 
Notes: Student outcomes are regressed on the proportion of teachers within a specific experience category. Each cell show the result of a separate regression. All 
models includes fixed effects for schools, grades and control for year and a quadratic for school size. Data used are at the grade by year level. Standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the school X year level. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1, 5 or 10 %-level.
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Table 12. Reduced form estimates of the effect of the CSCC program on student enrolment 
2009-2013 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Discontinuity sample  +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
School size All grades Grades 1-3 
1st-order polynomial 9.135*** 9.209*** 3.057 4.716*** 5.940*** 3.623  
  (3.000) (3.353) (4.747) (1.789) (2.046) (2.883) 
2nd-order polynomial 6.598 -4.749 -10.076 4.422* -2.045 -4.773  
 (4.528) (5.262) (8.259) (2.682) (3.200) (4.868) 
Observations 2,549 1,930 1,100 2,551 1,932 1,101 
       
Student background Lunch (0-4), all grades Supper (0-4), all grades 
1st-order polynomial -0.114* -0.221*** -0.149 -0.058 -0.139 -0.335* 
 (0.069) (0.084) (0.121) (0.112) (0.139) (0.194) 
2nd-order polynomial -0.164 -0.013 0.168 -0.234 -0.507** -0.532* 
 (0.106) (0.130) (0.188) (0.174) (0.216) (0.290) 
Observations 2,416 1,838 1,061 2,32 1,776 1,026 
Schools 543 413 235 543 413 235 
Notes: Specifications like in Table 2. Standard errors in models for lunch and supper participation adjusted for 
clustering at the school X year level.  
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Online Appendix Figures and Tables 
 
Figure A.1. Density of the forcing variable across the cut-off for program eligibility 
 
Manipulation tests: 
1. Conventional T=-0.61     P-value (0.54) 
2. Robust  T=-1.64     P-value (0.10) 
Note: Based on Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2017). 
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Figure A.2 Teacher experience 2005-2013 for three discontinuity samples 
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Table A.1 Teachers’ salaries (base plus additional salary) 
 
 
Payment Categories 
 
Year #1 #4 #7   
1997 9,365 11,235 16,827 
 1998 9,453 11,346 17,004 
 1999 10,787 12,144 18,242 
 2000 10,697 12,044 18,090 
 2001 10,494 11,814 17,746 
 2002 11,101 12,519 18,300 
 2003 8,990 10,138 14,819 
 2004 8,983 10,186 14,784 
 2005 9,230 10,424 14,512 
 2006 9,728 11,033 15,389 
 2007 10,441 11,927 16,746 
 2008 11,760 13,568 19,221 
 2009 12,777 14,918 21,201 
 2010 13,001 15,182 21,593 
 Nominal wage (with food complements) for 20hs teachers in Levels 1, 4 and 7 of the payment scale, in constant 
Uruguayan pesos of February 2011. Data from January in each year. Source: Area de Estadística y Análisis- 
Dirección Sectorial de Programación y Presupuesto - CODICEN- ANEP 
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Table A.2 Estimates of the effect of being eligible for the CSCC-program on the use of non-salary 
components 
Component (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 % kids 
having 
lunch at 
school 
has 
library 
room 
computers 
for 
educational 
use 
Number 
of 
computers 
study 
books per 
capita - 
1st grade 
School has 
community 
teacher 
CSCC eligibility 0.006 -0.066 0.145 0.612 -0.107 -0.016 
 (0.065) (0.132) (0.125) (0.830) (0.315) (0.127) 
       
Poverty-index 0.425*** -0.173 -0.078 -1.095 -0.216 0.611** 
 (0.157) (0.314) (0.306) (1.733) (0.815) (0.299) 
CSCC*Poverty-index -0.565** 0.150 -0.224 -0.440 1.171 0.099 
 (0.228) (0.461) (0.451) (2.815) (1.282) (0.418) 
Constant 0.624*** 0.329*** 0.690*** 1.954*** 1.227*** 0.642*** 
 (0.040) (0.085) (0.083) (0.451) (0.234) (0.081) 
       
Observations 237 220 214 214 197 237 
R-squared 0.059 0.016 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.141 
Notes: Estimates from regression discontinuity models as specified in Equation (1) in Section 4 using a discontinuity 
sample of 0.5 (schools with absolute poverty scores smaller than 0.5). Dates of measurement: students having lunch 
(2010), library (2008), computers (2009), study books (2011), community teachers (2010). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.3 Means of outcome variables 2005-2013 (discontinuity sample +/- 0.50) 
Years 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Teachers 
 
         
Experience (years) 
Non elegible 12.8 13.0 12.3 12.3 12.0 11.7 11.6 11.1 11.4 
Elegible 12.1 12.3 12.0 12.0 12.7 13.4 12.6 12.0 12.0 
Tenure (years) 
Non elegible 5.6 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.0 4.6 4.5 4.0 4.5 
Elegible 4.8 5.0 4.7 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.4 4.8 
  
         
Panel B: Students 
          
Insufficient attendance (%) 
Non elegible 6.4 5.4 7.7 6.6 9.8 7.3 5.5 6.2 8.1 
Elegible 7.5 5.8 7.3 6.6 10.9 6.9 6.2 7.3 7.4 
Grade retention (%) 
Non elegible 7.7 8.1 7.7 6.3 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.4 5.7 
Elegible 8.7 8.1 8.1 6.7 6.9 6.2 5.7 5.9 4.9 
Dropout (%) 
Non elegible 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.6 
Elegible 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.9 2.7 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.8 
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 Table A.4 Estimates of the pre-treatment balance in 2005 
Discontinuity sample +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Teacher Experience (in years)     
CSCC Program -0,033 0,007 0,028 
 (0.82) (0.963) (1.459) 
Observations 2.796 2.113 1.211 
Tenure (in years at current school) 
CSCC Program -0,67 -0,34 -0,892 
 (0.43) (0.507) (0.73) 
Observations 2.856 2.168 1.234 
Insufficient Attendance     
CSCC Program 0,247 -0,833 -0,898 
 (0.704) (0.832) (1.171) 
Observations 3.371 2.573 1.470 
Grade Retention       
CSCC Program 0,074 -0,228 1,079 
 (0.674) (0.794) (1.129) 
Observations 3.371 2.573 1.470 
Dropout       
CSCC Program 0,094 -0,141 -0,003 
 (0.205) (0.26) (0.362) 
Observations 3.371 2.573 1.470 
School size (number of students in primary education) 
CSCC Program -60.428** -74.557** -100.195** 
 (27.817) (32.038) (43.929) 
Observations 562 429 245 
Mothers with primary education or less (%)   
CSCC Program 2,034 3.891* 1,311 
 (1.796) (2.075) (2.845) 
Observations 562 429 245 
Children with unmet basic needs (%)   
CSCC Program 1,927 1,713 3,768 
 (1.94) (2.411) (3.448) 
Observations 562 429 245 
Notes: CSCC Program = 1 if the school is eligible for treatment. Coefficients are obtained from regressions of the outcome or 
covariate in 2005 on the poverty score, an indicator for program eligibility, their interaction and grade dummies. Standard errors 
clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.5 Sensitivity analysis: reduced form estimates of the effect of the CSCC program on 
experience and tenure 2009-2013 (pooled data) 
  Teacher experience Tenure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Discontinuity sample  +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
No controls       
1st-order 1.930*** 2.011*** 2.503*** 0.371** 0.743*** 0.611** 
 (0.312) (0.368) (0.516) (0.188) (0.217) (0.289) 
2nd-order 2.256*** 2.760*** 4.181*** 0.915*** 0.560* 1.494*** 
 (0.463) (0.567) (0.773) (0.258) (0.309) (0.388) 
Cubic  2.571*** 2.846*** 4.551*** 0.915*** 1.237*** 2.546*** 
  (0.603) (0.718) (0.963) (0.333) (0.389) (0.450) 
Local Polynomial        
1st-order 2.949*** 3.711*** 3.698*** 1.592*** 2.080*** 2.159*** 
 (0.955) (1.228) (1.297) (0.481) (0.478) (0.493) 
2nd-order 3.959*** 3.847*** 3.522* 2.091*** 2.227*** 2.240*** 
 (1.370) (1.483) (1.842) (0.577) (0.581) (0.614) 
Additonal controls       
1st-order 1.658*** 1.570*** 1.706*** 0.414** 0.761*** 0.697** 
 (0.302) (0.356) (0.505) (0.190) (0.219) (0.289) 
2nd-order 1.709*** 2.134*** 3.144*** 0.997*** 0.647** 1.532*** 
 (0.448) (0.549) (0.732) (0.259) (0.309) (0.374) 
Observations 13,749 10,341 5,868 13,878 10,441 5,920 
Controlling for pre-treatment 
dependent        
1st-order 1.822*** 1.709*** 1.930*** 0.551*** 0.892*** 0.907*** 
 (0.283) (0.329) (0.453) (0.183) (0.209) (0.278) 
2nd-order  1.792*** 2.195*** 3.497*** 1.149*** 0.784*** 1.384*** 
  (0.408) (0.494) (0.661) (0.249) (0.298) (0.373) 
Observations 12,902 9,645 5,441 13,028 9,741 5,492 
School level data       
1st-order 1.571*** 1.356*** 1.701*** 0.329 0.671*** 0.462 
 (0.337) (0.407) (0.559) (0.202) (0.247) (0.350) 
2nd-order 1.523*** 1.956*** 2.237** 0.937*** 0.544 1.079** 
 (0.510) (0.623) (0.869) (0.305) (0.378) (0.542) 
Observations 2,482 1,881 1,075 2,495 1,892 1,08 
Notes: Data used are at the grade level. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the school X year level. Local 
Polynomial RD point estimators as developed in Calonico et al. (2014). Additional controls are ‘mothers with 
primary education or less in 2005’ and ‘students with unmet basic needs in 2005’. Pre-treatment dependent for 
respectively experience or tenure are taken as most recent available from 2003-2005. ***, **, * statistically 
significant at the 1, 5 or 10 %-level. 
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Table A.6 Reduced form estimates of the effect of being eligible for the CSCC-program on 
teacher experience and tenure 2006-2013 
 Teacher experience Tenure 
Discontinuity sample +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
year = 2006 -0.287 -0.038 -0.088 -0.153 0.450 0.213 
(0.810) (0.961) (1.355) (0.501) (0.585) (0.840) 
Observations 2,922 2,220 1,242 2,961 2,251 1,263 
year = 2007 -0.475 -0.613 -0.478 -0.434 -0.198 -0.861 
(0.770) (0.900) (1.307) (0.478) (0.541) (0.788) 
Observations 2,933 2,249 1,270 2,955 2,262 1,283 
year = 2008 -0.022 -0.492 -0.527 -0.309 0.025 -0.715 
(0.792) (0.952) (1.479) (0.477) (0.547) (0.809) 
Observations 2,971 2,235 1,261 2,996 2,254 1,279 
       
year = 2009 1.228* 1.185 2.462** -0.189 0.438 -0.118 
(0.738) (0.878) (1.243) (0.445) (0.501) (0.663) 
Observations 2,814 2,114 1,196 2,855 2,150 1,211 
year = 2010 2.279*** 2.640*** 3.099*** 0.340 0.832* 0.790 
(0.670) (0.782) (1.163) (0.443) (0.500) (0.708) 
Observations 2,949 2,224 1,262 2,974 2,245 1,275 
       
year = 2011 1.712*** 1.658** 2.235** 0.586 0.930* 0.816 
 (0.634) (0.745) (0.986) (0.405) (0.479) (0.640) 
Observations 2,780 2,107 1,207 2,804 2,117 1,208 
year = 2012 1.637** 1.248 0.815 0.778* 0.679 0.740 
 (0.669) (0.796) (1.079) (0.414) (0.479) (0.617) 
Observations 2,732 2,067 1,155 2,749 2,082 1,160 
year = 2013 1.483** 0.684 0.405 0.532 0.825* 1.225* 
 (0.672) (0.790) (1.082) (0.423) (0.496) (0.667) 
Observations 2,474 1,829 1,048 2,496 1,847 1,066 
Notes: Estimates from models using a linear specification of the forcing variable and controls for grade and a 
quadratic of school size. Data used are at the grade level. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the school level. 
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1, 5 or 10 %-level. 
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Table A.7 Reduced form estimates of the effect of being eligible for the CSCC-program on 
insufficient attendance of students 2006-2013 
Discontinuity sample +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
 (1) (2) (3) 
year = 2006 -0.028 -0.152 -0.048 
(0.072) (0.093) (0.123) 
# Observations 3,365 2,567 1,470 
year = 2007 -0.190** -0.259** -0.102 
(0.091) (0.106) (0.153) 
# Observations 3,358 2,560 1,464 
year = 2008 -0.059 -0.137 0.055 
(0.091) (0.108) (0.148) 
# Observations 3,309 2,517 1,434 
    
year = 2009 -0.000 -0.127 -0.035 
(0.124) (0.148) (0.215) 
# Observations 3,252 2,475 1,409 
year = 2010 -0.127 -0.255** -0.048 
(0.097) (0.119) (0.169) 
# Observations 3,238 2,464 1,403 
    
year = 2011 -0.019 -0.092 -0.081 
 (0.082) (0.093) (0.128) 
# Observations 3,081 2,337 1,331 
year = 2012 -0.032 -0.015 -0.035 
 (0.095) (0.111) (0.145) 
# Observations 2,985 2,265 1,278 
year = 2013 -0.094 -0.337** -0.339 
 (0.148) (0.166) (0.228) 
# Observations 2,732 2,036 1,178 
Notes: see Table A.7 
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Table A.8 Reduced form estimates of the effect of being eligible for the CSCC program on grade 
retention 2006-2013 
Discontinuity sample +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
 (5) (6) (7) 
 
year = 2006 -0.092 -0.179* -0.093 
(0.080) (0.097) (0.148) 
# Observations 3,365 2,567 1,470 
year = 2007 -0.004 -0.080 0.074 
(0.088) (0.107) (0.160) 
# Observations 3,358 2,560 1,464 
year = 2008 -0.025 -0.038 -0.097 
(0.090) (0.111) (0.180) 
# Observations 3,309 2,517 1,434 
    
year = 2009 0.121 0.058 0.134 
(0.081) (0.098) (0.142) 
# Observations 3,257 2,477 1,410 
year = 2010 0.073 0.061 0.256 
(0.089) (0.107) (0.165) 
# Observations 3,238 2,464 1,403 
    
year = 2011 0.003 -0.011 0.160 
 (0.076) (0.089) (0.127) 
# Observations 3,081 2,337 1,331 
year = 2012 0.000 0.035 0.090 
 (0.087) (0.108) (0.148) 
# Observations 2,985 2,265 1,278 
year = 2013 -0.154* -0.202** -0.030 
 (0.081) (0.098) (0.135) 
# Observations 2,736 2,040 1,180 
Notes: see Table A.7 
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Table A.9 Reduced form estimates of the effect of being eligible for the CSCC program on the 
drop out 2006-2013 
Discontinuity sample +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
 (9) (10) (11) 
 
year = 2006 -0.043 -0.119* 0.018 
(0.052) (0.067) (0.082) 
# Observations 3,364 2,566 1,470 
year = 2007 -0.083 -0.214*** -0.118 
(0.064) (0.079) (0.092) 
# Observations 3,356 2,558 1,463 
year = 2008 0.008 -0.104 -0.072 
(0.062) (0.068) (0.082) 
# Observations 3,309 2,517 1,434 
    
year = 2009 0.233 0.105 -0.005 
(0.295) (0.311) (0.165) 
# Observations 3,249 2,47 1,407 
year = 2010 -0.059 -0.111 0.015 
(0.066) (0.081) (0.104) 
# Observations 3,238 2,464 1,403 
    
year = 2011 0.090 -0.086 -0.085 
 (0.067) (0.083) (0.115) 
# Observations 3,081 2,337 1,331 
year = 2012 -0.083 -0.213*** -0.279*** 
 (0.071) (0.082) (0.090) 
# Observations 2,985 2,265 1,278 
year = 2013 0.023 -0.004 0.019 
 (0.055) (0.067) (0.088) 
# Observations 2,736 2,040 1,180 
Notes: see Table A.7 
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Table A.10 Sensitivity analysis: reduced form estimates of the effect of the CSCC program on student outcomes 2009-2013  
  Insufficient Attendance Grade Retention Drop Out 
Discontinuity sample  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
Cubic  -0.040 0.014 0.370** 0.079 0.082 0.155 -0.093 -0.174* -0.019 
 (0.094) (0.113) (0.144) (0.083) (0.102) (0.136) (0.057) (0.099) (0.089)  
Local Polynomial          
1st-order 0.191 0.221 0.269 0.071 0.057 0.027 -0.029 0.011 0.109 
 (0.171) (0.184) (0.186) (0.130) (0.164) (0.209) (0.069) (0.085) (0.101) 
2nd-order 0.287 0.314 0.631*** 0.102 0.065 0.020 -0.087 0.048 0.092 
 (0.186) (0.199) (0.195) (0.183) (0.210) (0.240) (0.105) (0.103) (0.108) 
Additonal controls          
1st-order -0.045 -0.138** -0.109 0.019 0.002 0.125* 0.036 -0.061 -0.070 
 (0.046) (0.054) (0.076) (0.038) (0.046) (0.067) (0.057) (0.058) (0.047) 
2nd-order -0.241*** -0.124 0.055 -0.075 -0.007 -0.017 -0.082 -0.018 -0.152 
  (0.070) (0.085) (0.113) (0.059) (0.074) (0.106) (0.057) (0.057) (0.131) 
Observations 15288 11577 6599 15297 11583 6602 15289 11576 6599 
Pre-treatment dependent as control          
1st-order -0.063 -0.140*** -0.079 0.008 -0.008 0.111* 0.035 -0.057 -0.067 
 (0.043) (0.052) (0.073) (0.037) (0.045) (0.065) (0.062) (0.066) (0.045) 
2nd-order -0.210*** -0.089 0.126 -0.084 -0.018 0.003 -0.078 -0.022 -0.155 
 (0.067) (0.081) (0.110) (0.058) (0.072) (0.103) (0.061) (0.055) (0.140) 
Observations 15,284 11,573 6,599 15,293 11,579 6,602 15,285 11,572 6,599 
School level data          
1st-order -0.056 -0.156*** -0.095 0.014 -0.006 0.132** 0.052 -0.061 -0.067 
 (0.048) (0.057) (0.076) (0.038) (0.046) (0.062) (0.060) (0.080) (0.108) 
2nd-order -0.253*** -0.107 0.082 -0.082 -0.000 -0.008 -0.102 -0.057 -0.153 
 (0.073) (0.087) (0.119) (0.057) (0.070) (0.097) (0.091) (0.122) (0.168) 
Observations 2,552 1,933 1,101 2,552 1,933 1,101 2,552 1,933 1,101 
Notes: see Table A.6.  
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Table A.11 Estimates of the effect of the CSCC program on student outcomes by grade 2009-2013 
Grades 1-2  Insufficient Attendance Grade Retention Drop Out 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Discontinuity sample  +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
Reduced form          
1st-order polynomial -0.111* -0.235*** -0.167 -0.091 -0.110 0.091 0.071 -0.106 -0.038  
  (0.065) (0.075) (0.103) (0.064) (0.076) (0.105) (0.073) (0.083) (0.072) 
2nd-order polynomial  -0.390*** -0.273** 0.013 -0.212** -0.058 -0.207 -0.134 0.027 -0.039 
 (0.096) (0.115) (0.156) (0.095) (0.114) (0.162) (0.092) (0.112) (0.165)  
IV-estimates          
1st-order polynomial -0.201* -0.487*** -0.458 -0.163 -0.227 0.254 0.124 -0.215 -0.104 
 (0.117) (0.162) (0.292) (0.115) (0.159) (0.288) (0.130) (0.172) (0.200) 
2nd-order polynomial  -0.960*** -0.847** -0.009 -0.526** -0.179 -0.774 -0.321 0.059 -0.172 
  (0.268) (0.387) (0.625) (0.245) (0.344) (0.745) (0.233) (0.338) (0.657) 
Observations  5,100 3,862 2,200 5,100 3,862 2,200 5,098 3,861 2,199 
          
Grades 3-6          
Reduced form          
1st-order polynomial -0.022 -0.112** -0.055 0.067* 0.045 0.152** 0.024 -0.032 -0.081* 
 (0.044) (0.053) (0.075) (0.035) (0.043) (0.062) (0.062) (0.066) (0.047) 
2nd-order polynomial -0.183*** -0.025 0.113 -0.016 0.031 0.091 -0.052 -0.036 -0.212 
 (0.069) (0.084) (0.113) (0.055) (0.071) (0.102) (0.062) (0.050) (0.143) 
IV-estimates          
1st-order polynomial -0.042 -0.230** -0.152 0.120* 0.098 0.415** 0.041 -0.064 -0.222* 
 (0.080) (0.112) (0.207) (0.062) (0.090) (0.175) (0.112) (0.138) (0.134) 
2nd-order polynomial -0.449** -0.095 0.421 -0.034 0.097 0.391 -0.123 -0.112 -0.841 
 (0.181) (0.253) (0.476) (0.138) (0.211) (0.417) (0.156) (0.153) (0.652) 
Observations 10,188 7,715 4,399 10,197 7,721 4,402 10,191 7,715 4,400 
Notes: see Table 3. 
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Table A.12 Estimates of the effect of the CSCC program on attendance 2009-2013 
  All grades Grades 1-2 Grades 3-6 
Discontinuity sample  +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
          
Reduced form estimates          
Linear 0.038 0.149** 0.111 0.063 0.210*** 0.118 0.025 0.118** 0.107 
  (0.053) (0.059) (0.072) (0.063) (0.072) (0.092) (0.053) (0.059) (0.071) 
Quadratic 0.251*** 0.123 -0.000 0.334*** 0.175 0.081 0.210*** 0.097 -0.041  
  (0.071) (0.085) (0.122) (0.090) (0.107) (0.149) (0.070) (0.084) (0.121) 
IV-estimates 
 
         
Linear 
 
0.070 0.306** 0.303 0.116 0.433*** 0.322 0.046 0.242* 0.294 
 
 
(0.095) (0.126) (0.204) (0.114) (0.156) (0.259) (0.095) (0.125) (0.202) 
Quadratic 
 
0.617*** 0.391 0.036 0.821*** 0.551 0.356 0.514*** 0.310 -0.124 
 
 
(0.195) (0.268) (0.478) (0.249) (0.342) (0.617) (0.187) (0.259) (0.475) 
           
Observations 
 
15,297 11,583 6,602 5,100 3,862 2,200 10,197 7,721 4,402 
Notes: Estimates from models using a linear specification of the forcing variable. All models controls for grade and year. Data used are at the grade by year level. 
Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the school level. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1, 5 or 10 %-level. 
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Table A.13 Fixed effect estimates of the effect of experience on student outcomes 2005-2013 (pooled data) , grade 1-2 
  Insufficient Attendance Grade Retention Drop Out 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Discontinuity sample  +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 +/- 1.5 +/- 1.0 +/- 0.5 
Teacher experience (%):          
0-4 years 0.085*** 0.082** 0.044 0.015 0.037 -0.015 0.079** 0.089** 0.026 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.045) (0.027) (0.031) (0.041) (0.036) (0.041) (0.039) 
5-9 years 0.061* 0.042 0.063 0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.041 -0.044 0.008 
 (0.031) (0.036) (0.046) (0.028) (0.033) (0.043) (0.038) (0.043) (0.041) 
10-14 years -0.087*** -0.090** -0.123** 0.026 -0.006 0.027 0.025 0.002 0.050 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.048) (0.029) (0.033) (0.044) (0.039) (0.044) (0.042) 
15-19 years -0.122*** -0.095** -0.059 -0.009 -0.005 0.036 -0.106** -0.127** -0.101* 
 (0.040) (0.046) (0.062) (0.036) (0.042) (0.057) (0.049) (0.055) (0.055) 
20-24 years -0.041 -0.045 -0.120* -0.018 -0.045 -0.038 -0.053 -0.066 -0.055 
 (0.046) (0.053) (0.073) (0.042) (0.048) (0.067) (0.056) (0.064) (0.064) 
24-29 years -0.037 -0.007 0.065 -0.058 -0.003 -0.027 0.024 0.090 0.007 
 (0.046) (0.055) (0.074) (0.042) (0.049) (0.069) (0.056) (0.066) (0.066) 
30-34 years 0.133** 0.118* 0.253*** -0.025 -0.013 -0.037 0.000 0.022 0.005 
 (0.060) (0.070) (0.095) (0.054) (0.063) (0.087) (0.072) (0.084) (0.084) 
35-39 years 0.080 0.113 0.038 0.018 -0.119 0.224 0.208 0.174 -0.216 
 (0.146) (0.174) (0.242) (0.131) (0.157) (0.223) (0.175) (0.209) (0.213) 
Observations 8,456 6,396 3,629 8,456 6,396 3,629 8,452 6,393 3,627 
Notes: Student outcomes are regressed on the proportion of teachers within a specific experience category. Each cell shows the result of a separate regression. All 
models includes fixed effects for schools, grades and control for year and a quadratic for school size. Data used are at the grade by year level. Standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the school X year level. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1, 5 or 10 %-level. 
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Appendix The primary education system in Uruguay and the history of the CSCC program 
 
The public education system in Uruguay has approximately 2,000 primary schools. Public 
schools are grouped in 5 main categories: Rural (Escuelas Rurales), Standard Urban (Urbanas 
Comunes), CSCC (Contexto Socio Cultural Crítico), Double Shift (Tiempo Completo) and 
Practice (Habilitadas de Práctica y Práctica). In Table A.14 we show the number of schools in 
each category since 1992. Rural Schools are very small schools located in the countryside. 
Although they are the majority of school facilities (56%), they cover a very small fraction of 
students (7.2% in the period under analysis). The typical rural schools has on average only 1.4 
teachers in charge of the 6 grades of primary education, and has on average 18 students aged 6 to 
12 years old. The majority of Uruguayan primary school students attend Standard Urban schools 
(Section 2). These Standard Urban schools could receive the extra resources from the program. 
The number of Standard Urban schools has steadily decreased, from 792 schools in 1992 to 400 
in 2010. The same building facility of the Standard Urban school was used to implement one of 
the other types of schools that started to operate in that decade: CSCC schools, Double Shift and 
Practice. 
The CSCC program started to operate in 1995. Between 1995 and 1999 it was called 
Requerimiento Prioritario; from that year until 2011 it was named Contexto Socio Cultural 
Crítico. Since 2011 the compensation program for poor schools is named A.PR.EN.D.E.R. (in 
Spanish means “to learn”), and is an acronym for Atención Prioritaria en Entornos con 
Dificultades Estructurales Relativas. The assignment criteria for the program have changed 
during the years. However, the goal of the program remained unchanged; compensating students 
with a disadvantaged family background.  
In the year 1995 the first 155 schools started to participate in the CSCC Program (Table 
A.9). The majority (147) were schools that were already functioning as Standard Urban when 
they entered the program. In that first year of operation, schools were assigned based on school 
indicators of poor performance (i.e. grade retention) and characteristics of the houses in the 
neighbourhood were each school was located (based on information from census from the 
National Institute of Statistics). This first allocation of schools didn’t use direct measures of 
socioeconomic characteristics of the students attending the schools that were going to be treated. 
79 
 
Table A.14 School and students by type of primary school in Uruguay 1992-2013 
Schools Students Schools Students Schools Students Schools Students Schools Students Schools Students
1992 792      274,956  1,246      28,390     -      -        -      -       -      -       2,038   303,346  
1993 787      271,990  1,237      27,236     -      -        39       4,106    -      -       2,063   303,332  
1994 789      271,922  1,320      31,004     -      -        40       4,813    -      -       2,149   307,739  
1995 651      223,658  1,307      30,881     155      51,291   46       6,552    -      -       2,159   312,382  
1996 653      232,336  1,275      31,379     151      51,755   49       7,848    -      -       2,128   323,318  
1997 636      231,138  1,240      27,514     149      54,220   58       9,418    -      -       2,083   322,290  
1998 677      248,982  1,214      24,823     156      56,440   57       9,492    -      -       2,104   339,737  
1999 507      173,639  1,183      23,066     273      107,819  66       11,875   -      -       2,029   316,399  
2000 555      167,036  1,095      18,807     271      110,333  75       15,217   -      -       1,996   311,393  
2001 718      236,610  1,094      18,686     106      43,540   84       18,869   90       41,183   2,092   358,888  
2002 676      233,582  1,098      19,392     140      49,530   92       21,419   84       38,685   2,090   362,608  
2003 631      214,804  1,089      19,985     151      55,412   95       22,451   114      51,892   2,080   364,544  
2004 602      205,394  1,089      20,101     148      54,366   102      24,900   133      60,487   2,074   365,248  
2005 592      200,035  1,092      20,282     150      54,345   104      25,160   135      60,296   2,073   360,118  
2006 495      179,129  1,146      24,132     185      67,290   109      26,528   132      58,107   2,067   355,186  
2007 463      158,537  1,143      23,534     221      86,166   111      26,256   126      53,547   2,064   348,040  
2008 406      138,898  1,137      23,384     280      102,123  120      28,945   115      48,074   2,058   341,424  
2009 395      132,817  1,142      23,486     285      101,438  132      31,359   114      46,881   2,068   335,981  
2010 400      130,005  1,133      21,902     285      98,171   134      31,313   115      46,396   2,067   327,787  
2011 383      121,577  1,132      21,136     271      96,476   157      34,937   117      45,849   2,060   319,975  
2012 366      112,839  1,131      20,788     271      94,178   170      36,885   127      47,918   2,065   312,608  
2013 329      104,226  1,107      19,429     265      90,543   188      40,400   129      48,060   2,018   302,658  
Authors own calculations based on Monitor Educativo Educación Primaria (ANEP)
TOTAL
Year
Type of School
Standard Urban Rural CSCC Double Shift Practice
 
The program had an expansion between 1998 and 1999 and the program reached 273 schools. In 
the 1999 reallocation, schools entered or left the program based on three indicators: grade 
retention, insistences of students in 1st grade, and the percentage of students in 6th grade whose 
mothers had primary education as the highest level of formal education (with data from 1996) 
(ANEP 2005). 
In 2001 the program was reduced to 106 schools. In the 2002 reallocation, the program 
had a 32% net increase in the number of schools participating, when 85 new schools joined the 
program (80% increase considering the schools in the previous year), and 51 schools were 
dropped (48% of the schools in the previous year). The criteria used for the assignment to the 
CSCC program were based exclusively on socioeconomic variables of students. The variables 
used by the central authority were the percentage of children: (i) with unemployed household 
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heads (or doing very informal jobs); (ii) whose mothers didn’t achieve primary education; (iii) 
that were allowed to receive free lunch at school; and (iv) that lived in overcrowded houses. 
Each state in the country had a fixed slot of schools that were going to receive the extra 
resources, based on the number of students in the state and the percentage of children between 4 
and 12 years old in the poorest quintile of the distribution of income (ANEP 2005) 
From 2003 to 2005 the number of schools participating was around 150. In 2005 a new 
categorization of schools was made, and in the following years new schools entered the program, 
and others left because families living in the neighbourhoods in which they were located 
improved their socioeconomic status. The increase in the coverage rate of the program that 
started in 2006 ended in 2009, when 285 schools were receiving the extra resources, and the 
number of schools participating reached its maximum in 10 years. The 2005 re-categorization 
(schools moving in and out of the program) used indicators of human capital (level of education 
of mothers or, in her absence, the adult in charge of the children), socioeconomic level (unmet 
basic needs index), and an index of social integration. All this information was summarized 
(using factor analysis for data reduction) in a single measure that described the context of each 
school (cfr ANEP 2005). All the schools were then ranked according to this unique index, which 
is the forcing variable that we will use to perform the RD analysis. We focus our analysis on this 
period since the assignment to the program was fully transparent for these years. The eligibility 
rules changed again in 2011. Since then the assignment to the program was no longer based on 
the threshold of the poverty index from 2005. 
 
